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ABSTRACT

The United States is engaged in a war on terror against
enemies who wage "asymmetric war" through terrorism, media
manipulation, and "law-fare"---exploitingjudicial processes to
achieve political or military objectives.
This Article explores whether the fledgling International
Criminal Court (ICC) could eventually be exploited by these
groups as a tool of asymmetric "law-fare." It briefly traces the
history of the ICC and recounts why the United States opposes
the Court. Examining the methods of asymmetric war, the
Authors then explore whether the ICC could be exploited by
future asymmetric warriors.
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The Authors describe three asymmetric methods that could
be used to exploit the Court: (1) misusing the Court's
investigative processes, (2) filing questionable or fraudulent
complaints, and (3) manipulating mass media. They then
discuss three terrorist objectives that could be obtained through
asymmetric tactics.
The Authors conclude that, at its current stage, the Court
does not pose a large threat from this exploitation. A future,
more stable ICC, however, could pose a greater dangerespecially if the United States ratifies the Rome Treaty.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States is fighting a global war on terror with
battlefields in such distant lands as Afghanistan, Iraq, and the
Philippines. 1 U.S. enemies in this war are not nation-states, but a
network of terrorist groups; they seek to put "Satan's empire' 2 in
decline by dividing the United States from the international
community, destroying U.S. hegemony, and reducing the influence of
U.S. social values. It is not on the conventional field of battle,
however, that these enemies expect victory. Instead, through a
campaign of intimidation and terror they hope to drive the United
States into economic, political, and social recession.3 They wage an
asymmetric war.
Asymmetric warfare-engaging a superior enemy by using
alternative means to achieve political or military objectives-is not a
new concept; some cite the Biblical story of David and Goliath as the
classic example of such asymmetry. 4 Considering the military might
of the modern U.S. Goliath, it is no surprise its enemies have turned
to other methods-hijackings, suicide bombings, and computer
network attacks-to catapult the stone that will bring down the
world's only remaining superpower. But those who oppose the United

1.
See President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the State of the Union (Feb. 7, 2005), in PUB. PAPERS, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/print/20050202-11.html. (last visited
Feb. 5, 2006) (explaining where U.S. troops are fighting the War on Terror).
2.
See Sheikh Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ladin, Fatwah Urging Jihad
Against Americans, in AL-QUAS AS-'ARABI (London), Feb. 23, 1998, (providing the
English translation of Osama Bin Laden's fatwah: "We also call on Muslim ulema,
leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch raids on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's
available at http://www.ict.org.illarticles/
supporters allying with them.....),
fatwah.htm (last visited 2/5/06).
Osama bin Laden, Pre-recorded Speech Sent to and Televised by Al-Jazeera
3.
(Oct. 30, 2004), (threatening to bleed America "to the point of bankruptcy"), transcript
available at Full transcript of bin Ladin's speech, Aljazeera.net, Nov. 1, 2004,
http://english.aljazeera.net/NRexeres/79C6AF22-98FB-4AlC-B21F2BC36E87F61F.htm.
4.

See

BRAD ROBERTS,

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS,

ASYMMETRIC

CONFLICT 2010, IDA DOc. D-2538, at 1 (2000) (using David and Goliath analogy).
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States also seek non-violent means to advance their agenda. When
possible, they will exploit both domestic and international judicial
institutions to influence U.S. policy; this practice is known as "lawfare." 5
This Article explores whether the fledgling International
Criminal Court (ICC) could eventually be used as a weapon of
asymmetric "law-fare" against the United States. Part II briefly
traces the history of the ICC and recounts the reasons the United
States opposes the court. Part III examines the purpose and methods
of asymmetric war, including past uses of "law-fare." Part IV
discusses whether the ICC could be exploited in the future to cow the
U.S. Goliath into a defensive posture and disrupt its war on terror. Is
the ICC-or will it become-the "Big Bad Wolf? ' 6 The Article
concludes that this threat is unlikely in the court's early
development; however, the ICC's evolving mechanisms may make it
vulnerable to asymmetric exploitation in the future.

II. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: HISTORY AND CONTROVERSY
A. All Roads Lead to Rome
Throughout the twentieth century the international community
flirted time and again with the concept of a standing criminal court.
At the conclusion of World War I, the victorious nations begrudgingly
allowed Germany to prosecute its own nationals for war crimes. 7 The

5.
6.

See infra notes 92-114 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., JOSEPH JACOBS, ENGLISH FAIRY TALES AND MORE ENGLISH FAIRY
TALES (Donald Haase ed., ABC-CLIO 2002) (1890). The "Big Bad Wolf' refers to an
adaptation of Joseph Jacob's English fairy tale about "three little pigs" who are
terrorized by a wolf who threatens to blow their houses down. Id. This Article explores
whether the exploitation of the ICC would be a true threat to the United States or
merely "huffing and puffing." See id.
7.
Nearly nine million people from thirty-two nations died during World War
I. See HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETHCENTURY EXPERIENCE 17 (1999) (describing international experience in World War I
that led to desire for a standing criminal court). After the War, the Allied victors
pushed for prosecution of the Germans and Central Powers for their violations of the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Id. at 19. Due to practical considerations, the
victorious nations allowed the Germans to prosecute their own accused. See Regina
Horton, The Long Road to Hypocrisy: The United States and the InternationalCriminal
Court, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 1041, 1044 (2003) (explaining that Germany refused to
surrender any accused and how the United States rejected the idea of prosecuting
Kaiser Wilhelm to avoid infringing on Germany's sovereignty); see also WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3-4 (2001)

(noting Germany never accepted military tribunals proposed by the Allies); Gerard E.
O'Connor, Note, The Pursuit of Justice and Accountability: Why the United States
Should Support the Establishment Of An InternationalCriminal Court, 27 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 927, 936 (1999) (explaining the need to stabilize the Weimar Republic).
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victors soon regretted that decision, however, as Germany conducted
little more than show trials and nearly all violators went
unpunished.8 Between the two World Wars, the League of Nations
contemplated an international criminal court, but that idea proved
too bold as politics and the outbreak of World War II squandered the
opportunity. 9 After the Treaty of Paris, the World War II victors
applied the lessons learned from past mistakes; they established the
Nuremburg Tribunal and the International Tribunal for the Far
East. 10 Although met with accusations of "victor's justice,"1 1 the
tribunals created a new paradigm of international criminal
jurisprudence 12-the
accused were charged with crimes against
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 13 These two
tribunals constituted the first real efforts of the modern era to
establish a valid and powerful international court. 14 But with the fall
of the "Iron Curtain," the dream of a standing international court
15
remained relatively undisturbed until the 1990s.
The eruption of ethnic conflict and slaughter in Rwanda and
Yugoslavia during the 1990s starkly reminded the world of its need
for an international criminal court. In response, the U.N. Security
Council created two ad hoc tribunals: the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International

8.
Of nearly 900 potential defendants, only twelve were tried, several were
acquitted, and those found guilty were sentenced to modest terms of imprisonment.
See SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 4 ("The trials looked rather more like disciplinary
proceedings of the German Army than any international reckoning.").
9.
See id. at 4-5 (noting failure of the League of Nations to get sufficient
number of ratifying states); see also Horton, supra note 7, at 1044 (noting that after
World War I the League established an advisory committee to create plans for a
Permanent Court of International Justice); O'Connor, supra note 7, at 937 (discussing
how World War II marked an end of such efforts).
10.
At the Nuremburg Tribunal, nineteen of twenty-two defendants were found
guilty. See BALL, supra note 7, at 44-85. At the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East, of the twenty-five defendants who were tried, all were found guilty and
seven were sentenced to death by hanging. See id. See generally ARIEH J. KOCHAVI,
PRELUDE TO NUREMBURG: ALLIED WAR CRIMES POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF
PUNISHMENT (1998); REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS (1949).

11.
BALL, supra note 7, at 49, 85 (noting also that "Nullem crimen et nulla
poena sine lege" [No crime and no punishment without law] was the cry of defense
counsel for Japanese and Nazi defendants); see also SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 6
(observing ex post facto criminalization threatened tribunals' legitimacy); O'Connor,
supra note 7, at 941 (describing perception that the victorious Allies sat in judgment
over defeated Germans and Japanese).
12.
These tribunals gave birth to the doctrines of command responsibility,
individual criminal responsibility, and the rejection of the defenses of "state doctrine"
and "superior orders." See O'Connor, supra note 7, at 942-43.
13.
See SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 6 (explaining the court's jurisdiction is
limited to three categories of crimes).
14.
O'Connor, supra note 7, at 941.
15.
See Horton, supra note 7, at 1046 (explaining how Cold War politics
hindered efforts to establish a court).
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Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 16 Drawing upon precedents
set forth in the Nuremburg and Far East Tribunals, the courts went
to work-with great expense and many challenges. 17 And though the
tribunals significantly contributed to international jurisprudence,18
they also highlighted anew the need for a standing criminal court. 19
Meanwhile, the United States continued to advocate for the
creation of the proposed ICC; 20 its support continued well into the
Rome Conference. 21 But when the Conference convened in Rome on

16.
See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993)
(creating the ICTY) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., at
3, U.N. Doc S/Res/955 (1993) (creating the ICTR) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
17.
For example, the 2004-2005 budget of the ICTY was $298,226,300, see G.A.
Res. 255, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/58/255 (2004), and the 2004-2005
budget for the ICTR was $235,324,200, see G.A. Res. 253, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N.
Doc A/RES/58/253 (2004); see also Horton, supra note 7, at 1049 (noting that it took
time to establish the tribunals, to find a place to hold court, and to select judges and a
prosecutor).
See Horton, supra note 7, at 1050 (citing Richard J. Goldstone & Gary
18.
Jonathan Bass, Lessons from the International Criminal Tribunals, in THE UNITED
CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND
STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (Sarah B. Sewell & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000).
19.
See Horton, supra note 7, at 1046. Some might argue that the pending case
of Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, again highlights the need for such a court. Saddam
Didn't Confess to Mass Killings: Lawyer, REUTERS, Sept. 8, 2005, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/08/content_- 476200.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2006). Saddam's defense team has questioned the ability to have a fair trial
within Iraq. Id. Saddam's defense attorney, Khalil Dulaimi, has complained, "There is
no chance of holding a just and honest trial in such an atmosphere .... .. " Id.
Meanwhile, Iraq's neighbor, Iran, is preparing its own charges against Saddam for fear
that "Iraqi prosecutors had failed to lay sufficient charges against him .... ." Iran
Slams Saddam Trial Plans as "Insufficient,'THE DAILY STAR, Sept. 6, 2005, available at
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition-ID=10&articleID=18246&categ-id=2
(last visited Feb. 5, 2006).
20.
See John Seguin, Note, Denouncing the InternationalCriminal Court: An
Examination of U.S. Objections to the Rome Statute, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 85, 86-87 (2000)
(recounting how the United States joined the worldwide call for the creation of a
permanent international criminal court). The original vision for the ICC looked quite
different from the court that emerged from the Rome Conference in 1998. See
SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 97. In a draft prepared in advance of the conference by the
International Law Commission (ILC), the proposed statute denied the Chief Prosecutor
the ability to initiate prosecution proprio motu. See id. The ILC conceived of the Court
as "a facility available to States Parties to its Statute, and in certain cases to the
Security Council who alone were empowered to initiate a case." Id. (citing Report of the
InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, 2 May - 22 July
1994, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 89-90 (1994)).
See Seguin, supra note 20, at 87 ("Indeed, American support for the
21.
creation of an international criminal court continued throughout the drafting and
revising process as the United States participated in the Preparatory Committee
sessions."); see also David J. Scheffer, U.S. Policy and the International Criminal
Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 529, 531 (1999).
The U.S. Delegation [at the Rome Conference] insisted that definitions of war
crimes be drawn from customary international law and that they respect the
requirements and intent of military objectives during combat. We had long
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June 15, 1998, it quickly became apparent-thanks largely to the
concerted efforts of numerous non-governmental organizations
(NGOs)22-that the ICC would look far different than originally
envisioned by the United States. 23 When it came time to vote 24 for
establishment of the Court, the statute overwhelmingly passed: 120
(including the
States voted in favor, 21 States abstained, and 7 States
25
United States, Libya, China, and Iraq) voting against.
While partly defeated at the Rome Conference, the Clinton
administration remained engaged in the development of the Court for
the next two years, addressing many of its concerns. 26 The United
States eventually signed the treaty on December 31, 2000;27 however,
on May 6, 2002-under the direction of President Bush-the United
States formally notified the United Nations that it no longer intended

sought a high threshold for the court's jurisdiction over war crimes, since
individual soldiers often commit isolated war crimes that by themselves should
not automatically trigger the massive machinery of the ICC.
22.
NGOs such as Amnesty International helped ensure that modifications such
as the proprio motu power made it into the final version of the treaty. See Christopher
Keith Hall, Challenges Ahead for the United Nations Preparatory Committee Drafting a
Statute for a Permanent International Criminal Court AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Al
Index: IOR 40/03/96 (1996), http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdfflOR400031996ENGLISH
$File/IOR4000396.pdf. During the drafting process at the Rome Conference, "like minded
countries" and NGOs made the proprio motu prosecutor one of their battle cries.
SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 97. But "[s]ome powerful States vigorously opposed the idea,
fearful that the position might be occupied by an NGO-friendly litigator with an attitude."
Id. See generally David Davenport, The New Diplomacy, POLICY REVIEW ONLINE (Dec.
2002 & Jan. 2003) (detailing role of NGOs and their efforts to shape ICC),
www.policyreview.orgDEC02/ davenport.html.
23.
Concerns arose on the part of the U.S. representatives regarding the role of
the U.N. Security Council, the list of "core crimes" over which the Court would have
jurisdiction, and the scope of jurisdiction over persons who were not nationals of State
Parties. SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 17. In its final form, the Court emerged with
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the "crime of
aggression." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 1,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), corrected through
May 8, 2000, by U.N. Doc. CN.177.2000.TREATIES-5 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
24.
The United States exercised its procedural right that a vote should be
taken rather than allowing adoption by consensus. See SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 18.
25.
See Seguin, supra note 20, at 86-87.
26.
The United States took an active role in the preparatory commissions and
in drafting the elements of crimes and procedures for operation of the Court. Marc
Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Remarks to the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (May 6, 2002), http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/9949.htm (last
visited 2/5/06).
27.
In signing the treaty, President Clinton affirmed the United States' "strong
support for international accountability and for bringing to justice perpetrators of
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity." Statement on the Rome Treaty on
the International Criminal Court, 37 PUB. PAPERS 1 (Jan. 8, 2001). But he also
reiterated that the United States was not abandoning its concerns about significant
flaws in the treaty. Id.
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to become a party to the Rome Statute. 28 This notification was
negatively characterized by critics as an "unsigning" of the treaty,
contrary to international law. 29 When the ICC began30 its "legal life"
on July 1, 2002, the United States sat on the sidelines.
B. Conflict and Controversy: Objections to the InternationalCriminal
Court
The United States justified its rejection of the Rome Statute on
various grounds. 3 1 The United States objected to ICC jurisdiction
over nationals of a non-party state, 32 contested the article that
prohibited State Parties from making reservations to the Rome
Treaty, 33 and disagreed with including the "crime of aggression"
within the ICC's purview. 34 Moreover, the United States opposed the

28.
Diane F. Orentlicher, Unilateral Multilateralism: United States Policy
Toward the International Criminal Court, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 415, 422 (2004); see
also Grossman, supra note 26 (stating that U.S. policymakers believed the Rome
Statute undermined the role of the U.N. Security Council, created an unchecked
prosecutorial system, and had flaws open for exploitation and politically motivated
prosecutions).
29.
The United States did not literally "unsign" the treaty, but the European
Union expressed its concern "that this unilateral action may have undesirable
consequences on multilateral Treaty-making and generally on the rule of law in
international relations." Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 422 (citing the declaration of
the European Union).
30.
Id. at 415.
31.
President Clinton originally opposed the framework of the ICC on the basis
that the Court might not operate in accordance with the Rome Statute. Id. at 420.
Others have suggested that even after a war is won, the ICC could "defer
reconciliation" by initiating a period of finger-pointing and the "blame game" that could
"render a peace impossible." Michael L. Smidt, The InternationalCriminal Court: An
Effective Means of Deterrence?, 167 MIL. L. REV. 156, 186 (2001) (quoting Leila Sadat
Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665, 672 (1996)).
32.
See SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 61; see also Michael D. Mysak, Judging the
Giant: An Examination of American Opposition to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 63 SASK. L. REV. 275, 278 (2000) (discussing U.S. opposition to Article
12(2) of the Rome Treaty); Seguin, supra note 20, at 98. But see Michael P. Scharf,
ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S.
Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 67, 98 (2001) (arguing that the Rome Treaty does
not bind non-parties but simply confirms individuals are subject to laws applicable in
territories in which they travel).
33.
See Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 120 ("No reservations may be made to
this Statute"); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19(a),
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (noting that a state has liberty to make reservations to a
multilateral treaty unless all reservations are prohibited); Horton, supra note 7, at
1070.
34.
The "crime of aggression" has not yet been defined under the statute. See
Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 5(2) ("The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 123
defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise
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push to grant the ICC universal jurisdiction and remained unhappy
with the compromise
that established
the
principle
of
"complementarity," which allowed the Court to prosecute crimes over
35
the objection of the relevant State Party in certain circumstances.
The United States believed complementarity would cede too much
36
sovereignty to an international body.
Most significantly, the United States resisted the Chief
Prosecutor's proprio motu 37 power, which gave him the ability to
independently initiate investigations based on information from
virtually any source, as long as he had the approval of the Court's
Pre-Trial Chamber. 38 Policymakers worried that if the Office of the
Prosecutor became politicized, the Court might be inundated with
frivolous litigation. 39 The United States also feared that these
politicized powers could be abused to the detriment of U.S. national
interests, considering the unpopular world opinion of the U.S.
40
military and accompanying anti-U.S. sentiment.

jurisdiction with respect to this crime."); see also Seguin, supra note 20, at 97
(discussing opposition to the crime).
35.
See Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 17. The ICC was given the power to
initiate investigations and prosecutions even where a State Party had decided not to
prosecute one of its nationals-but only if the Court determined that the state was
"unwilling or unable" to undertake an investigation or prosecution. See generally infra
notes 258-67 and accompanying text (discussing ramifications of complementarity).
36.
See Seguin, supra note 20, at 92-93 (highlighting the U.S. argument).
37.
Proprio motu is a Latin phrase that literally means "by one's own motion."
HUTCHINSON ENCYCLOPAEDIA (2000). In the context of the ICC, it refers to the Chief
Prosecutor's ability to initiate an investigation on his own accord, with the approval of
two Judges of the Court's Pre-Trial Chamber.
See infra notes 120-43 and
accompanying text (discussing ramifications of the power).
38.
Mysak, supra note 32, at 278 (discussing opposition). Originally, the Chief
Prosecutor was to have no proprio motu power. See SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 97. The
broad powers included in the final version, however, required the Chief Prosecutor "to
cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal
responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and
exonerating circumstances equally." Id. at 103 (citing Rome Statute, supra note 23, art.
19(6)).
39.
Mysak, supra note 32, at 279.
But see SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 99
(quoting Justice Louise Arbour, "In my experience based on the work of the two
Tribunals to date, I believe that the real challenge posed to a Prosecutor is to choose
from many meritorious complaints the appropriate ones for international intervention,
rather than to weed out weak or frivolous ones.").
40.
Mysak, supra note 32, at 285-86; see also Seguin, supra note 20, at 94
(quoting the then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Bill Richardson: "We must
not turn the International Criminal Court--or its Prosecutor-into a human rights
ombudsman open to, and responsible for responding to, any and all complaints from
any source."). During the Rome Conference, the United States declared that an
independent prosecutor "not only offers little by way of advancing the mandate of the
Court and the principles of prosecutorial independence and effectiveness, but also will
make much more difficult the Prosecutor's central task of thoroughly and fairly
investigating the most egregious of crimes." SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 97.
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Supporters of the ICC provide persuasive academic rebuttals to
these U.S. objections, arguing primarily that the Court's built-in
procedural safeguards should soothe any U.S. fears.4 1 But while
there currently may be little to fear, none of these arguments can
address U.S. concerns of a future situation arising under a more
powerful ICC. Indeed, the "tenacious commitment" of some countries
to the framework agreed upon at the Rome Conference may have
been "driven by a desire to constrain the American behemoth" and
control U.S. forces abroad. 42 In the end, only one result can fully
satisfy the United States' desire-full immunity for U.S. military
forces and their civilian leadership.4 3 With forces deployed around
the world in numbers exceeding 250,000, 44 the risk is deemed too
great to the national security and safety of U.S. soldiers. 45 This same

41.
See SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 85; Remigius Chibueze, United States
Objections to the International Criminal Court: A Paradox of "Operation Enduring
Freedom", 9 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 19, 37 (2003) (contending that the U.S. fear is
unfounded due to checks in the statute); Horton, supra note 7, at 1041; Mysak, supra
note 32, at 286 (arguing that Americans have no grounded fear of politics taking over
the Chief Prosecutor's office due to procedural safeguards); see also Rome Statute,
supra note 23, art. 1 (stating that ICC jurisdiction "shall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions").
42.
Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 427 (questioning motives of those who
supported ICC). Constraining "the American behemoth" with the ICC may also have
been a goal of our "allies"-the "like-minded states" at the Rome Conference-to give
them greater political parity with the United States. Damir Arnaut, When in
Rome...? The International Criminal Court and Avenues for U.S. Participation,43
VA. J. INT'L L. 525, 535-37 (2003).
43.
David Scheffer, the Ambassador-at-Large during the ICC negotiations, has
remarked:
I spent many years seeking full immunity for our military forces and their
civilian leadership in negotiations that quite frankly sometimes seemed the
theater of the absurd. I was given nothing to offer-certainly not signature or
ratification-in return for an absolutist carve-out that other governments,
particularly our closest allies, found arrogant and hypocritical.
David J. Scheffer, Fourteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: A
Negotiators Perspective on the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 1, 7-8
(2001); see Alisha D. Telci, Note, The InternationalCriminal Court: Is the United States
Overlooking an Easier Way to Hold Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden
Accountable for Their Actions?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 451, 464 (noting that the national
security strategy of the United States is to protect its citizens from ICC jurisdiction).
44.
As of January 2005, there were approximately 250,000 soldiers, sailors,
airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen deployed in support of combat, peacekeeping,
and deterrence operations.
GlobalSecurity.org, Where are the Legions? Global
Deployments
of U.S.
Forces, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/globaldeployments.htm (last visited 2/5/06) (compiling statistics on reputable website).
45.
Ambassador Scheffer has remarked,
In the eight years of my deliberations in Washington on the International
Criminal Court-beginning with the work of the International Law
Commission in 1993 and 1994-I do not recall hearing any senior Defense
Department official refer to the core purpose of the Court, namely to advance
international justice and enforce the Law of Armed Conflict. Every single
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concern led Congress to pass the internationally unpopular 46
47
American Service-Members Protection Act (ASPA).
Thus, despite the long and difficult road to the ICC, the United
States ultimately rejected the Rome Treaty due to fears that the
Court could be misused to harm national interests. 48 In other words,
policymakers were concerned about asymmetric tactics and the
potential for adversaries of the United States to use the Court as a
tool of "law-fare."

III. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND THE PRACTICE OF "LAW-FARE"

A. Historical Underpinnings
Exploiting an enemy's weakness on the battlefield has always
been a goal of superior militaries, from the time of Genghis Khan to
today. 49 But discussion of asymmetric warfare usually focuses on the
weaker adversary engaging the stronger by exploiting alternative
means of achieving its objectives. 6°
It is often associated with

discussion was dominated by how the Court would impact the United States
military.
Scheffer, supra note 43, at 9.
46.
See Telci, supra note 43, at 472-73 (discussing how the American ServiceMembers Protection Act (ASPA) caused concern to U.S. allies).
NGOs and the
European Parliament also critiqued the ASPA isolationistic themes as harmful to U.S.
interests. See id. at 474.
47.
In the Act's findings, Congress found,
[U.S.] Armed forces operating overseas could be conceivably prosecuted by the
international court even if the United States has not agreed to be bound by the
treaty. Not only is this contrary to the most fundamental principles of treaty
law, it could inhibit the ability of the United States to use its military to meet
alliance obligations and participate in multinational operations.
American Service-Members' Protection Act of 2002, § 5, Priv. L. No. 107-206m, 116
Stat. 820 (2002). For further discussion about ASPA, see Sasha Markovic, The Modern
Version of the Shot Heard Round the World: America's Flawed Revolution Against the
InternationalCriminal Court and the Rest of the World, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 263, 26979 (2004).

48.

See Markovic, supra note 47, at 269.

49.
See STEVEN METZ & DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II, ASYMMETRY AND U.S.
MILITARY STRATEGY: DEFINITION, BACKGROUND, AND STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 2 (2001)

(citing Genghis Khan's use of "superior mobility, operational speed, intelligence,
synchronization, training, and morale to crush enemies in lightning campaigns"); see
also William J. Hartman, Globalization and Asymmetrical Warfare 25 (Apr. 2002)
(unpublished graduate thesis, No. AU/ACSC/053/2001-4, Air Command and Staff
College) (on file with Authors) (citing frequent American military use of asymmetric
tactics); Michael O'Halloran, A Kill is a Kill: Asymmetrically Attacking U.S. Airpower
6 (Jun. 1999) (unpublished graduate thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies) (on
file with Authors) (noting that "underdogs" are not alone in using asymmetric warfare).
50.
See ROBERTS, supranote 4, at 1 (discussing asymmetric warfare).
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"unconventional war," where a warring party thinks and acts "in a
manner that is not defensible with a conventional military force." 51
52
Some advantages to using asymmetric warfare include its efficiency
'5 3
and its ability to be a "force multiplier.
In one notable example of asymmetric tactics, Hannibal used
raids and threats in 218 B.C. to outlast an overwhelming force of
Roman soldiers on the Italian peninsula, causing the Romans to
54
employ such a large army that it almost bankrupted the Republic.
More recent examples include the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
Native American campaigns against British and U.S. troops, 55 the
German use of submarine warfare in World War II to offset British
sea supremacy, 56 and the Chechen insurgency against Russia in the
1990s. 57 Thus, ancient tactics have been brought into modern times
to achieve political objectives.
B. Modern Asymmetric Warriors
For the United States in a post-September 11 world, the war on
58
terror has redefined the importance of asymmetric warfare.
"[T]errorism has often been viewed as the weapon of the weak
directed at a stronger adversary" 59-an image Osama bin Laden has
nurtured through his speeches. 60 Terrorism has become the method

51.
Hartman, supra note 49, at 25.
52.
DAVID L. GRANGE, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: OLD METHOD, NEW CONCERN 1 (2001) (noting that asymmetric
warfare may be done "on the cheap" and is part of our enemies' "economy of force").
53.
See Stephen Sloan, Terrorism and Asymmetry, in CHALLENGING THE
UNITED STATES SYMMETRICALLY AND ASYMMETRICALLY: CAN AMERICA BE DEFEATED?
175 (Lloyd J. Matthews ed., 1998).
54.
See BRITTANICA CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA, Punic Wars (2005).
55.
Ike Skelton, America's Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts,
COMBINED ARMS CENTER MILITARY REV., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 22 (discussing the 1763
Native American victory over Colonel Bouquet's forces marching to Fort Pitt during
Pontiac's War).
56.
Steven Metz, Strategic Asymmetry, COMBINED ARMS CENTER MILITARY
REV., July-Aug. 2001, at 23.
57.
Vincent J. Goulding, Jr., Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare,
PARAMETERS, Winter 2000-2001, at 21, available at http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/gouldingasymmetric.htm; see also GRANGE, supra note 52, at 1 (citing twentieth century examples
like the airplane in World War I, panzer blitzkrieg in World War II, and the Strategic
Defense Initiative "that helped end the nuclear arms race').
58.
See GRANGE, supra note 52, at 1 ("Because no group or state can defeat the
U.S. in conventional warfare, America's adversaries and potential adversaries are
turning to asymmetric strategies.").
59.
Sloan, supra note 53, at 175. But see Metz, supra note 56, at 23-3 (noting
that terrorism is 'low-cost" but also "high-risk" because it "can generate a backlash
against users or reinforce rather than erode a target's resolve").
60.
See Yonat Shimron, Professor Compiles bin Laden Speeches, NEWS 4
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jul. 25, 2005, at B1 ("What [Professor] Lawrence finds at
the core of bin Laden's carefully constructed persona is not a terrorist seeking a target,
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of choice to carry out asymmetric attacks, and it has been employed
with some success. U.S. citizens fear and expect suicide bombings,
Future
hijackings, and assassinations at home and abroad.6 1
"virtual" terror attacks on the U.S. economic system through
computer viruses and hacking could severely hamper U.S. economic
might.62 Individual attacks on U.S. citizens abroad could chill
international travel. And the decisive tool of terror-the use of
weapons of mass destruction-could provide terrorists the ability to
carry out devastation in the U.S. heartland, creating the ultimate
domestic insecurity.
As the head of the world's mightiest military, the U.S.
Department of Defense began to plan for the menace of asymmetric
warfare during the 1990s.63 This official recognition of the threat
came with the dawning of a new era-more U.S. inhabitants had died
at the hands of asymmetric assaults in the 1980s and 1990s than in
all conventional battles during that same period. 64 The attacks on
September 11, 2001, dramatically demonstrated the devastating cost
that Americans would pay if the United States did not address the
new peril from contemporary asymmetric warfare.
But, unlike the past, modern asymmetric warriors are typically
not established nation-states;6 5 they are "underdogs" who resort to
the tactics of the weak to achieve their aims. 66 This new class of
warrior consists of intergovernmental organizations, "transnational
guerrilla and terrorists groups, multinational organizations ... and a
rapidly growing number of nongovernmental organizations in a wide

but a victim seeking redress. Bin Laden portrays the entire Muslim civilization as
conquered, subdued and robbed of its resources by the West .... ).
61.
Inciting fear in the United States is, in fact, one goal of terrorists. In a
2001 speech, Osama bin Laden cheered, "There is America, full of fear from its north to
its south, from its west to its east. Thank God for that." See Text of Osama bin Laden's
Taped Remarks, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 7, 2001.
62.
See Smidt, supra note 31, at 231 (discussing an example where the New
York Stock Exchange is targeted by a "crippling computer network attack").
63.
See Metz, supra note 56, at 23-3 (describing the origin of the term
"asymmetric warfare" in Department of Defense literature beginning in 1995 and
expanding through the 1990s); see also U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION
2020, at 5 (2000) (noting that asymmetric attacks are "perhaps the most serious danger
the United States faces in the immediate future").
64.
Hartman, supranote 49, at 24-25.
65.
See Robert D. Steele, InformationPeacekeeping: The PurestForm of War, in
CHALLENGING

THE

UNITED

STATES SYMMETRICALLY

AND

ASYMMETRICALLY:

CAN

AMERICA BE DEFEATED? 144 (Lloyd J. Matthews ed., 1998) (describing three "warrior
classes" that the U.S. must confront today, including low-tech brutes, low-tech seers,
and high-tech seers).
See Sloan, supra note 53, at 173-74; see also Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A
66.
Virtuous Warrior in a Savage World, 8 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 71, 72 (1997-1998) ("For
most potential adversaries, attacking the United States asymmetrically is the only
reasonable warfighting strategy.").
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variety of functional areas. '67 These contemporary enemies "will no
more seek to confront U.S. power on U.S. terms than David would
68
have gone out against Goliath with a sword and a shield.
In this respect, the United States has become a "victim of its own
success." 69 Its enemies have watched the conventional superiority of
the U.S. military on the battlefield but have equally "witnessed the
U.S. struggles with unconventional operations and warfare in
Vietnam, Somalia, Beirut, Kosovo, in the Kobar Towers bombing, the
USS Cole bombing, the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and
Dar-es Salaam, and the September 11, 2001 attacks . ... ,,70 Indeed,
the United States' reaction to some attacks may have reinforced the
belief that asymmetric tactics are the only way to achieve victory:
The 1983 guerilla attack in Lebanon that killed 241 U.S. service
members led to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. In 1993,
Somali militiamen downed two U.S. helicopters and killed 18 American
troops. Though the Somalis lost hundreds of their own in the battle,
the stunning reports of dead Americans in a land of little strategic
importance completely undercut political support for U.S. presence
71
there. Soon after, the United States packed up and headed home.

Having learned from history, modern asymmetric warriors choose
tactics they know can produce desired results.
While "only the most desperate antagonists would rely solely on
asymmetric methods," 72 these adversaries currently lack the ability
to wage a conventional-style war against the United States. 73 Yet
they must be careful-attacks that become Pearl Harbor equivalents
may galvanize the political will of the U.S. public and turn
international opinion against the terrorists' cause. These modern
asymmetric warriors realize the need for other armaments to
undermine the U.S. Goliath's political will to wage a long-term war

67.
Sloan, supra note 53, at 179 (quoting Maurice A. East, The International
System Perspective and Foreign Policy, in MAURICE A. EAST ET AL., WHY NATIONS ACT:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES IN COMPARATIVE FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES 143, 145
(1978)).

68.
O'Halloran, supra note 49, at 1 (quoting BRUCE W. BENNETT ET AL.,
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., THEATER ANALYSIS AND MODELING IN AN ERA OF
UNCERTAINTY: THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF WARFARE xvii (1994)); see also Smidt,
supra note 31, at 222 ("Future opponents of the United States are likely to use
asymmetrical' warfare in order to attempt to defeat the United States and its allies.").
69.
John E. Rhodes, The US and the Changing Nature of Warfare, DEF. AND
FOREIGN AFF. STRATEGIC POL'Y, Oct. 2001, at 11-12.
70.
Id.
71.
Mark Mazzetti et al., The Far Horizon, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 8,
2001, at 12; see also Dunlap, supra note 66, at 72 (noting how barbaric treatment of one
U.S. soldier "helped destroy the public support that the U.S. military needed to succeed
in Somalia").
Metz, supra note 56, at 23-3.
72.
73.
See Bennett, supra note 69, at xvi-xviii (discussing the challenges of
limited resource adversaries with respect to a developed nation-state like the United
States).
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on terror. Therefore, the arsenal of asymmetry contains two uniquely
useful weapons: the "media war" and "law-fare."
C. Asymmetric Exploitationof Mass Media
Asymmetric warriors have learned to manipulate the pervasive
and powerful tools of the modern mass media to create a dramatic
psychological impact 74 on their opponents-a "media war. ' 75 This use
of the media is a type of "psychological operation" that erodes an
adversary's morale and creates a military advantage. 76 Through the
skillful use of the global media, asymmetric warriors can bombard the
public with the horrors of war on a daily basis. 77 For instance,
terrorists purposely adopt a brutally violent style of warfare without
rules that is quite different from that accepted in the United States
and other open democracies. 78 They then exploit mass media to
intimidate and threaten these societies. "[T]errorists now . . . have
the capability to intensify their psychological attacks on a mass
audience in ways undreamed of by the most skillful and dedicated
'79
terrorists of the past.
These asymmetric warriors believe that a major superpower
such as the United States can be defeated through embarrassment,
extending the length of a conflict, and escalating the war "in ways
that make it hard for the U.S. to counter-escalate."8 0 The essence of
this approach "is that the American public can be made weary of the
costs of prolonged war, which will translate into an eventual political

74.
Hartman, supra note 49, at 26 ("[A]symmetrical attacks seek to have a
major psychological impact, an attack on one's will and ability to act or freedom of
action."); see Metz, supra note 56, at 23-2 ("[They] seek a major psychological impact,
such as shock or confusion, that affects an opponent's initiative, freedom of action or
will.").
75.

See Phillip Hammond, The Media War on Terrorism, 1 J. CRIME, CONFLICT,

& MEDIA 23 (2003) (discussing the role of mass media in the war on terror).
76.
Hartman, supra note 49, at 23-24 (quoting Napoleon Bonaparte, "In war
the moral is to the material as three to one"). Another study noted,
We tend to miscalculate the real ability of opponents to devise low-cost, lowtech methods to offset capabilities of technologically superior adversaries.
Effective psychological operations, media manipulation, atrocities, genocide,
and unrestricted assaults against civilians are familiar methods used by groups
that employ widely available technology, but apply to its use a different set of
values than those prevailing in the West.
JOHN F. LEHMAN & HARVEY SICHERMAN, FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INST., AMERICA
THE VULNERABLE: OUR MILITARY PROBLEMS AND HOW TO FIX THEM 220 (2002).
77.
See GRANGE, supra note 52 at 1.

78.
Colonel Dunlap refers to this as "neo-absolutist war" because this "war by
any means" approach is "war without rules or scruples"-a different psychology than
used by the U.S. warrior. Dunlap, supra note 66, at 74.
79.
Sloan, supra note 53, at 177.
80.

See ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 18.
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willingness to settle the conflict" on favorable terms. 81 This tactic is
particularly effective in open societies where "the pain threshold of
the population to endure casualties of any appreciable numbers may
now be limited ....,,82 Skillful use of the tools of mass media can
bring the fears of terrorism and the losses of war into the average
person's home.
Additionally, mass media is an effective means of propagandausing communication to influence the opinions or behavior of groups
84
of people 83-with a proven track record against the U.S. military.
The Vietnam War is frequently held up as a model for using
propaganda to strike at the U.S. will to fight.8 5 North Vietnam used
mass media to severely undermine the moral appeal of the war to the
United States. 86 Indeed, the term 'Vietnam redux" describes the
vulnerability in "the political will of the American public to avoid
casualties and quagmires. ' 87
As one former North Vietnamese
commander said, "The conscience of America was part of its warmaking capability, and we were turning that power in our favor.
America lost because of its democracy; through dissent and protest it
lost the ability to mobilize a will to win."88
D. The Practiceof "Law-Fare"
This Article has thus far discussed physical uses of asymmetric
warfare on the battlefield and the exploitation of those methods in
mass media.
In the contemporary world, however, another
asymmetric tactic has emerged-the concept of "law-fare." This term

81.
Id.
This psychological impact is particularly important where an
antagonist "sees its survival or vital interest at stake and the other is protecting or
promoting less-than-vital interests" and when the other "can only sustain the will for a
short war." Metz, supra note 56, at 23-4.
82.
Sloan, supra note 53, at 178; see also Dunlap, supra note 66, at 77 (noting
the "growing aversion in both the electorate and in the uniformed ranks" toward any
friendly casualties in war). But see ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 29 (noting that these
perceived U.S. weaknesses may actually be pitfalls for the aggressor because
Americans have shown a historical willingness to sustain large amounts of casualties
where vital national interests are at stake).
83.
See LEE ANN FUJII, PAPER PREPARED FOR THE ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION, NEW ORLEANS, LA, THE DIFFUSION OF A

GENOCIDAL NORM IN RWANDA (2002); Internews, Media in Conflict, Case Study:
Rwanda (2003), http://www.internews.org/mediainconflict/micrwanda.html
(both
sources outlining how a private Rwandan radio station conducted a media propaganda
program over a period of years that "was used to set the scene for the mass killing that
later erupted" in the Rwanda genocidal tragedy in 1994).
84.
See O'Halloran, supra note 49, at 11-12 (citing instances such as Vietnam).
85.
Id.
86.
O'Halloran, supra note 49, at 13.
87.
See ROBERTS, supra note 4, at S-3.
88.
Dunlap, supra note 66, at 72 (quoting How North Vietnam Won the War,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1995, at A8).
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refers to weaker foes employing judicial processes to challenge
stronger nations and win advantages otherwise unattainable on the
89
conventional battlefield:
In a nation such as ours, where citizens and rulers alike are subject to
the rule of law, judicial processes may be a potent weapon indeed for a
Under certain
foreign state or a nonstate actor seeking redress.
circumstances, even the president may be subject to civil process. The
paradigmatic use of lawfare is a "decapitation strike" where, instead of
using stealth aircraft with precision bombs, an enemy might use a
personal lawsuit against the U.S. commander in Iraq to harass and
distract him from his mission. Likewise, enemy partisans might, as the
government argues, use legal processes to gather intelligence about
U.S. military operations, exploiting the criminal discovery process for
90
their own nefarious purposes.

This tactic is already occurring in countries like Colombia, where
peasants may raise false charges in court against military leaders
who are making progress against "kingpin rebels." 91
The strategy of misusing judicial processes to achieve
unwarranted victories has existed in the business world since the
dawn of the modern litigious society.9 2 It may be more expensive for
a business to litigate a frivolous tort lawsuit than to simply settle the
case out of court.9 3 In this way, some businesses have "paid off'
undeserving plaintiffs to avoid the greater expense of litigating their
"innocence" in a court of law. The concept of "law-fare" is not far
removed from this practice; indeed, business has developed various
"asymmetric cost models" to plan for these legal tactics.9 4 Similarly,

89.
See Phillip Carter, Legal Combat: Are Enemies Waging War in Our Courts?,
SLATE, Apr. 4, 2005.
Id. (arguing for the United States to join the ICC). Mr. Carter goes on to
90.
argue that we should "embrace lawfare, for it is vastly preferable to the bloody,
expensive, and destructive forms of warfare that ravaged the world in the 20th
century." Id. Mr. Carter does not take into account, however, the reality that "lawfare" will be only one tactic used by a ruthless enemy who will also employ the most
heinous violence to achieve its political and military aims.
91.
Mary A. O'Grady, What About Colombia's Terrorists?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5,
2001, at A17 (arguing that Colombian terrorists have successfully waged a media war
that has turned attention on reforming Colombia's military rather than fighting
ruthless internal terrorist groups).
92.
See Linda S. Mullenix, The Future of Tort Reform: Possible Lessons from
the World Trade Center Victim Compensation Fund, 53 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1323 (2004)
("[T]he current tort litigation system inspires, induces, and rewards baseless, meritless
lawsuits: lawsuits that should never should be brought or, if filed, ought to be
dismissed before litigation progresses.").
93.
Id.
94.
Chris Guthrie, FramingFrivolous Litigation:A Psychological Theory, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 163, 172-73 (2000) (describing various asymmetric cost models to explain
frivolous litigation). According to one model,
frivolous litigation persists because the defendant must incur the cost of
responding to plaintiffs frivolous complaint .... [A] rational plaintiff will file a
frivolous complaint because he assumes he will be able to recover a settlement
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asymmetric warriors may use this model-when the threat of judicial
processes is severe enough-to deter the U.S. Goliath or achieve some
other victory.
When combined with the power of mass media, even pseudojudicial processes can bring about startling results. For instance, in
May 1967, Nobel laureate Bertrand Russell began what became
known as the "Russell Tribunal"-an independent investigation into
the conduct of the United States in Vietnam. 95 North Vietnam had
charged the United States with the systematic and intentional
bombing of medical facilities, citing maps found on downed U.S. pilots
that had specifically marked out these facilities. 96 In a stunning
media victory for the North, the Russell Tribunal convicted "the U.S.
of a war crime, and later went on with other charges to 'convict' on
the charge of genocide for attempting to 'wipe out a whole people and
imposing the Pax Americana on . ..Vietnam.' ' 97 This triumph of
"law-fare" undermined the moral legitimacy of the United States in
its intervention in Vietnam and helped erode the public will to carry
on the fight in that faraway land.
Furthermore, when judicial avenues are available to carry out
these "law-fare" tactics, litigants will bring cases. For instance,
consider the controversial and inconsistent use of universal
jurisdiction laws for key international crimes, 98 which are currently
on the books in over 120 countries. 99 Universal jurisdiction laws
authorize a nation to prosecute "crimes committed outside the state's
territory which are not linked to that state by. the nationality of the
suspect or of the victim or by harm to the state's own national

from the rational defendant up to the amount of the defendant's cost of
responding.
Id.
95.
96.
97.

O'Halloran, supra note 49, at 13.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14 (quoting Guenter Lewy, Deception and Revolutionary Warfare in

Vietnam, in DECEPTION OPERATIONS: STUDIES IN THE EAST-WEST CONTEXT 171, 181

(David A. Charters & Maurice A.J. Tugwell eds., 1990)).
98.

Universal Jurisdiction-quasi delicta juris gentium-applies to a limited
number of crimes for which any State, even absent a personal or
territorial link to the offence, is entitled to try the offender. In customary
international law, these crimes are piracy, the slave trade, and traffic in
children and women.

SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 60. "The application of universal jurisdiction is also widely
recognized for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, that is, for the core
crimes of the Rome Statute." Id.
99.
Press Release, Amnesty International, Al News Service, Rwanda: Belgian
Court Judgment is a Great Step in the Fight Against Impunity (June 8, 2001)
(counting
countries
with
some
form
of
universal
jurisdiction
law),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR470012001?open&of=ENG-RWA.
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interests."'10 0 Despite criticisms, supporters of these laws contend
they are fully acceptable under international law and that there is
little evidence these statutes will be hijacked by politically motivated
prosecutions. 10 1 Whatever the merit of these laws, however, it is
clear they attract litigants.
When Belgium attempted to enforce its universal jurisdiction
law in the mid-1990s, 10 2 the nation soon garnered over thirty highprofile cases against world leaders, including President George H.W.
10 3
Bush and Israel's Ariel Sharon, for apparently political motives.
Eventually, many of these cases were dismissed by the Belgian
Supreme Court, but not before capturing significant media
attention. 0 4 Similarly, universal jurisdiction laws have attracted
cases in Switzerland, Belgium, and Germany in response to the 2003
Iraq War. 10 5 If the ICC were available to adversaries of the United
States, it is likely that these "litigants" would also make use of its
judicial processes.

Legal Memorandum from Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction:
100.
The Duty of States to Enact and Enforce Legislation 4 (2001) [hereinafter Amnesty
available at http://web.amnesty.org/pages/legal
International Memorandum],
memorandum.
101.
See SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 61 ("It is true that, in practice, universal
jurisdiction is rarely exercised by States, and many would probably prefer not to be
pushed into matters that in the past, for diplomatic, or other reasons, they have sought
to avoid."). Supporters arguing in favor of universal jurisdiction laws note that
sometimes the territorial state that has clear jurisdiction fails to act for various
reasons: (1) the legal system may have collapsed, (2) lack of resources or security
prevents prosecution in the legal system, (3) lack of political will to bring the case, or
(4) the prevention of the case by executive authorities. See Amnesty International
Memorandum, supra note 100.
102.
See Belgium: Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of
International Humanitarian Law, Feb. 10, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 918, 920 (recognizing
"universal competence for the Belgian courts to deal with" numerous international war
crimes).
103.
"The Court also faced criminal complaints against Cuban President Fidel
Castro, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, former DRC foreign minister Abuldaye
Yerodia, former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, and others." Steven R. Ratner,
Editorial Comment: Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L.,
888-90 (2003). "For some targets of criminal complaints, the evidence was, at least to
this writer, extremely flimsy, underlying Verhofstadt's claim the motives were strictly
political." Id. at 892; see Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New
Approaches to Past Abuses, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 301, 370 (2003).
[I]nconsistent standards give states the scope to vex and harass their political
opponents. Fear of such politically motivated cases is already a primary
ground offered by the United States for remaining outside of the ICC, and has
also been raised in objection to the use of universal jurisdiction, most notably
by Henry Kissinger.
104.
See Belgium Nixes War-Crimes Charges Against Bush, Powell, Cheney,
Sharon, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 25, 2003 (noting that the Belgian Supreme Court
found that Belgium "no longer has a legal basis to charge" the defendants).
105.
See War Crimes Charges Filed in Switzerland Against Bush, Blair, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, May 3, 2003.
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In sum, history will judge whether the United States made the
correct choice in rejecting the ICC. Given the long and arduous road
that led to the ICC's creation, it is no surprise many nations resent
the current U.S. hostility to the Court. Yet the United States now
lives in a media-saturated world where asymmetric attacksespecially as employed by terrorists-have become a way of life. The
tactics of asymmetry have evolved to exploit even judicial processes;
the ICC is not immune. But it remains to be seen whether the Court
will become the "Big Bad Wolf' feared by the United States. In other
words, can the ICC be manipulated as a tool of asymmetric warfare?

IV. EXPLOITING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A WEAPON
OF ASYMMETRIC "LAW-FARE"

The ICC is still in its infancy 0 6 with new judges and its first
Chief Prosecutor. 0 7 As with most revolutionary institutions, the
Court must survive an initial period of instability 0 8 before firmly
establishing its permanence. If, however, it endures this preliminary
time of trial-especially if the United States changes course and

106.
Within its first year, the Office of the Prosecutor grew "tenfold" from a staff
of four to forty-one members. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Address to the
Third Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, the Hague (Sept. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Hague Address].
107.
On June 16, 2003, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo began his term as the Chief
Prosecutor to the ICC. See Biography/CurriculumVitae of Dr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo,
www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp-bio.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). Hailing from Argentina
with a broad background in prosecuting military commanders for human rights abuses,
Mr. Moreno-Ocampo has an impressive record, although he does not have a personal
background in the military. See id.
108.
For instance, as of September 2005, the Chief Prosecutor has acknowledged
opening investigations in only three cases: one in Darfur, Sudan (referred by the U.N.
Security Council); one in Uganda; and one in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with
one other referral being considered in the Central African Republic. See Situations and
Cases, www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html. Moreover, the very existence of the Court is in
jeopardy due to an aggressive campaign by the United States to negotiate bilateral
"Article 98" to avoid ICC jurisdiction. See Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 98.
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under
international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is
required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the court can
first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the
surrender.
See generally Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 425 (arguing that U.S. Article 98
agreements violate the spirit of the treaty); Chet J. Tan, Jr., The Proliferation of
Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements Among Non-Ratifiers of the Rome Statute of the
InternationalCriminal Court, 19 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 1115 (2004) (discussing how the
United States is undermining the Court).
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throws its full backing behind the court' 0 9-it will evolve into a
formidable force. At that time, non-state actors seeking to use
judicial institutions as a means of "law-fare" against the United
States may find the ICC an attractive target to manipulate.
Adversaries of the United States could potentially use three
asymmetric tactics to exploit the ICC: (1) misusing the Court's
investigative processes, (2) filing questionable or fraudulent
complaints for the Court to investigate, and (3) employing mass
media in ICC cases to intensify international pressure against the
United States. Future asymmetric warriors could coordinate these
tactics as part of a larger strategy to put the United States on the
defensive and dampen its international war on terror.
A. Exploiting the Investigative Processes of the International
Criminal Court
Those who oppose U.S. hegemony will find an attractive tool in
the processes of the ICC, especially if the United States ratifies the
Rome Treaty. 110 History has shown that complaints filed in foreign
courts have had little impact on U.S. policymaking; these courts have
no teeth."' 1 But the ICC is unlike other global courts in both form
and substance. Combined with the Chief Prosecutor's proprio motu
power and the increasing
influence
of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), these differences make the ICC a more
dangerous weapon of asymmetric "law-fare."
1. The Broad Mandate of the International Criminal Court
A key difference between the ICC and other global courts is its
broad mandate. For example, the ICTR and ICTY were created in
response to events that had already occurred, which limited the

109.
The Rome Statute requires that all parties to the treaty "accept[ the
jurisdiction of the Court." Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 12(1). Moreover, a State
Party has a duty to cooperate with the Court in numerous matters. See id. arts. 86
(general obligation to cooperate), 87 (general requests for cooperation), & 93 (other
cooperation).
110.
Even without ratifying the Rome Treaty, the United States may be in some
jeopardy. As Professor Scharf argues:
[T]he refusal of the United States to become a party would not bar the ICC
from issuing an indictment charging American citizens with war crimes or
crimes against humanity .....
Such an indictment by an international judicial
body could obviously do serious damage to American foreign policy, even if
there was no prospect that the accused would ever actually face trial.
Scharf, supra note 32, at 69.
111.
See infra notes 108-19,157-67 and accompanying text (discussing impact of
foreign courts).
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jurisdiction of those courts to specified prior crimes. 112 In essence,
the tribunals were an extension of the U.N. Security Council's
Chapter VII powers, formed to maintain peace and security by
Parties before the
delivering justice to particular regions. 118
tribunals did not submit to their jurisdiction-it was imposed upon
them. 114 Further, the United Nations created the tribunals with the
benefit of hindsight, which allowed it to develop a narrow mandate
As a self-contained system with limited
for each court. 115
jurisdiction, neither tribunal could evolve into a Frankenstein-like
116
creature that acted in ways its master did not intend.
The ICC, on the other hand, is a forward-looking, consent-based
court1 17 with few built-in restraints to keep its broad mandate in

112.
See U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. arts. 1-4, 7, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955
(1994) [ICTR Statute]; U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess. 3217th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827
(1993) (setting forth the tribunals' competence, jurisdictional crimes, and limitations)
[ICTY Statute].

113.
See Peggy E. Rancilio, From Nuremberg to Rome: Establishing an
InternationalCriminalCourt and the Need for U.S. Participation,78 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 299, 318 (2001) (discussing the ICTR); David Tolbert, The Evolving Architecture of

International Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7, 9
(2002) (discussing the ICTY).
114.
Rancilio, supra note 113, at 318-19 (noting the U.N. Security Councilimposed jurisdiction); Tolbert, supra note 113, at 7, 9 (same); see also At a Glance:
Hague Tribunal (BBC television broadcast June 10, 2005). The jurisdiction granted to
the ICTY has "primacy over national prosecutions" and has even taken on an
independent judicial nature that sets it above its creator, the U.N. Security Council, by
allowing it to decide questions related to its own jurisdiction. Jose E. Alvarez,
Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic Case, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 245 (1996) (citing decisions by
Trial and Appellate Chambers of ICTY).
115.
The ICTY's territorial jurisdiction is confined to crimes committed on its
territory subsequent to 1991; the ICTR's territorial and personal jurisdiction is limited
to crimes committed in Rwanda or by Rwandan nationals in neighboring countries
during 1994. See SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 54.
116.
Despite its constraints, the ICTY sustained criticism for the perceived
"political prosecution" of Slobodan Milosevic, the former President of Serbia. See

Steven Erlanger, Yugoslav Chief Says Milosevic Shouldn't Be Sent to The Hague, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001. After Milosevic surrendered for war crime charges, his successor
expressed concern at extraditing him to the Hague: 'Mr. Milosevic should be brought to
trial on war crimes charges, too-but before domestic courts." Id.; see Jack Snyder &

Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of
International Justice, 28 INT'L SECURITY, Winter 2003-2004, at 21-22 (citing a
nationwide survey indicating Serbians felt Mr. Milosevic's eventual trial at the Hague
was "unjust"); Anthony Deutsch, Milosevic Challenges Legality of UN Tribunal,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 24, 2001 (noting the local perception that the ICTY is a
"marionette court" of NATO).
117.
As one commentator noted:
The ICC has the formal authority to adjudge the actions of high state officials
as criminal and to send them to jail, no matter how lofty the accused's position
or undisputed the legality of those acts under domestic law. While the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
Rwanda (ICTR) also possess this authority, those institutions operate directly
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check. Unlike self-contained, finite tribunals, the ICC has broad
future jurisdiction in the one hundred countries that have ratified the
Rome Treaty 1 8 and yielded a portion of their sovereignty to the
Court. With a bottomless pool of clients, the ICC is like a shop that is
open for business but unsure which customer might walk through the
door. 1 1 9

Moreover, the ICC does not suffer from the same limitations as
other global courts. Foreign courts that rely on universal jurisdiction
laws are limited by their lack of international support and political
clout to enforce their decisions. 120 Similarly, even global courts such
as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have little enforcement
power. 121 Domestic U.S. courts, on the other hand, possess the
jurisdiction and power to carry out their decisions but view
international law from a distinctly U.S. perspective-with the

under the control of the United Nations Security Council and within narrow
territorial limits. The ICC, by contrast, is largely independent of the Council
and vests the power to investigate and prosecute the politically sensitive crimes
within its broad territorial sweep in a single individual ....
Allison Marston Danner, Enhancingthe Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial
Discretionat the InternationalCriminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 510 (2003).
118.
See CICC, State Signatures and Ratification Chart, http://www.iccnow.org/
countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html (listing States that have ratified or signed
the Rome Treaty).
119.
See generally Gary T. Dempsey, Reasonable Doubt: The Case Against the
Proposed International Criminal Court, Cato Policy Analysis No. 311 (July 16, 1998)
(arguing ICC's jurisdiction could become a "Leviathan"), http://www.cato.org/pubs/
pas/pa-311.pdf.
120.
See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text (discussing universal
jurisdiction laws); see also infra notes 166-75 and accompanying text (discussing
problems with enforcing these laws).
121.
Set up to hear grievances between nation-states, the ICJ's judgments can
only be enforced by an aggrieved party who appeals to the U.N. Security Council which
may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to give
effect to the judgment. See U.N CHARTER art. 94, para. 2; see also Orentlicher, supra
note 28, at 415. When the United States accepted the ICJ's jurisdiction in 1946, it did
so with reservations.

See WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON

INTERNATIONAL LAW 408-09 (4th ed. 2003). In 1986, during the bitter case of
Nicaragua v. United States, the United States withdrew its acceptance of the Court's
jurisdiction, in violation of its promise to provide a minimum notice of six months prior
to any withdrawal. See id. The Court did not recognize the withdrawal and decided
the merits of the case. See id. In response, the United States terminated its general
acceptance of ICJ compulsory jurisdiction. See id. at 409; see also Nicar. v. U.S., 1986
I.C.J. 98 (June 27). Many nations, including the United States, routinely fail to abide
by the Court's final judgments. See Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments
of the InternationalCourt of Justice since 1987, 98 AM. J. INT'L. L. 434, 434-37 (2004)
(noting some non-compliance but no direct state defiance to the ICJ); see also Eric A.
Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 37 (2005) (noting 40% state compliance in compulsory jurisdiction cases, 60%
compliance for treaty disputes, and 85.7% compliance when jurisdiction comes from
special agreement) (citing Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in
Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of InternationalDispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1229, 1309-10 (2004)).
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ultimate check of the U.S. Supreme Court to prevent anomalous
results.122
In the end, the ICC is an attractive tool for asymmetric "lawfare" because nations have empowered it with the legitimacy and
jurisdiction to carry out its rulings. 123 Were the United States to
ratify the Rome Statute, there would be no practical check on those
This makes the Court
decisions by U.S. judicial institutions.
potentially dangerous.
2. The ProprioMotu Power and the Obligation to "Pre-Investigate"
One feature of the ICC differentiates it from every other court
the United States has faced outside its borders-the proprio motu
power of its Chief Prosecutor. 124 The construction of the ICC system
makes it unlikely for the Chief Prosecutor to initiate a frivolous
investigation, 125 especially in light of the many heinous violations
that occur regularly throughout the world. But when a future
claimant comes through the ICC door with a grievance against a U.S.
official or military member, the completely independent 126 Chief

122.
For example, claims are often filed in U.S. courts under the Alien Torts
Claim Act (ATCA), passed in the Judiciary Act of 1789. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)
("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."). Since the war on terror began, ATCA cases have been filed on behalf of
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. See generally Meredith B. Osborn, Recent
Development: Rasul v. Bush: Federal Courts Have Jurisdictionover Habeas Challenges
and Other Claims Brought by Guantanamo Detainees, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 265
(2005). While the ATCA might also be a means to attempt asymmetric warfare, it is a
creature of U.S. law that the U.S. Supreme Court has severely limited and which could
be defeated by various immunities, defenses, and the political question doctrine. See
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) (severely limiting the ATCA to
common law violations of international law that existed in 1789).
123.
While the ICC does have international legitimacy, it is notable that, in the
face of defiance by a country such as the United States, its only true enforcement power
would also be recourse to the U.N. Security Council, where the United States has a
veto. See Rome Statute, supra note 23, arts. 72(7)(a)(ii), 87(7). If the United States
ratifies the Rome Treaty, however, this type of "guerilla warfare diplomacy" would
create major foreign relations problems since the nation would be seen as defaulting on
its treaty obligations.
124.
See infra notes 128-53 and accompanying text.
125.
As a matter of policy, the Chief Prosecutor has said his office will prioritize
cases based on its limited resources, the gravity of alleged offenses, and the inherent
difficulties in conducting investigations in certain countries. See INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, ANNEX TO THE "PAPER ON SOME POLICY
ISSUES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR": REFERRALS AND COMMUNICATIONS 1,

4, http://www.icc.cpi.int/library/organs/otp/policy-annexfinal_210404.pdf [hereinafter
ANNEX]. But see Smidt, supra note 31, at 157-58 ("Political prosecutions before the
ICC are so probable that the forces of good may be deterred from taking on the forces of
evil.").
126.
The Rome Statute makes clear that the Chief Prosecutor "shall act
independently as a separate organ of the Court," with "full authority over the
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Prosecutor will be compelled under a statutory duty to analyze the
seriousness of the information received. 127 There will be no free
passes for U.S. citizens, 128 and there lies the opportunity for
asymmetric exploitation.
The Chief Prosecutor has a duty to initiate an investigation into
13 0
worthy allegations of war crimes 129 and crimes against humanity both of which have been levied against the United States in the past
fifteen years. 131 When the Chief Prosecutor is given information of a
potential violation, he "shall analyse the seriousness of the
information received.
For this purpose he may seek additional
information from States, organs of the United Nations,
intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other
reliable sources .... ,"132 This reality has been set out in the Chief
Prosecutor's policy papers:
In all cases the Office of the Prosecutor must first conduct an analysis
of information in order to determine whether the statutory threshold to
start an investigation is met: there must be "a reasonable basis to

management and administration of the Office" and assisted by "one or more Deputy
Prosecutors." Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 42(1)-(2). The Chief Prosecutor is
elected "by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the members of the Assembly of
States Parties" for a term of "nine years and shall not be eligible for re-election." Id.
art. 42(4). The Chief Prosecutor (and judges) have "immunity from legal process" in
any member State-both during and after their terms-for words and acts "in their
official capacity." Id. art. 48(2).
127.
Id. art. 15(2).
128.
Consider the situation where a U.S. soldier is acquitted of prisoner abuse,
as has happened in cases such as United States v. Sgt. Darin Broady, an Army
reservist accused of beating a detainee in an Afghan military prison camp. See Another
GI Cleared of Afghan Prisoner Abuse, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 8, 2005. Should the
Chief Prosecutor respect that decision under the principle of complementarity even if
military prosecutors did a sloppy job or the military jury nullified the verdict? Would
that be considered a "sham" prosecution by the United States?
129.
'War crimes" include acts such as "torture or inhuman treatment,"
"willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health," "willfully
depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person from the rights of a fair and
regular trial," and "committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment." Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2).
130.
"Crimes against humanity" include "imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law"
and "torture," when "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population." Id. art. 7(1).
131.
See Open Letter from Irene Khan, Secretary General, Amnesty
International, to President George W. Bush (May 7, 2004), http://web.amnesty.org/
library/index/engamr51O782004.
132.
Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 15(2) (emphasis added). The Chief
Prosecutor is expected to rely upon non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for
information; however, even "neutral and impartial" NGOs may act contrary to their
principles. For example, the Italian Red Cross treated and hid four Iraqi insurgents
from U.S. forces with the knowledge of the Italian government last year in exchange for
the freedom of two kidnapped aid workers. See Official: Italians Treated, Hid Iraqi
Insurgents,ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 25, 2005. Such a move seriously undermines the
credibility of such an organization and affects its reliability. See id.
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proceed"'.... Accordingly, the Office will analyse the seriousness of all
communications received [from other sources], with the assistance of
other information readily available to the Office. The extent of the
analysis will be affected by the detail and substantive nature of the
available information ....
[The Prosecutor will gather and assess
relevant information until such point as he is satisfied that there is, or
133
is not, a reasonable basis to proceed.

The Chief Prosecutor has acknowledged that "in every case" he
conducts a "preliminary examination" of all information he receives
from individuals or NGOs.' 3 4 In other words, those who have both
"information" and an anti-U.S. agenda will always have the ear of a
prosecutor who is obliged under the law to consider all allegations.
In February 2006, the Chief Prosecutor gave the world its first
glimpse of a potentially controversial preliminary investigation
stemming from the proprio motu power. Having received over 240
communications regarding the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the
Chief Prosecutor posted a ten-page response explaining why his office
had chosen not to initiate a formal investigation into the
complaints. 135 As part of the preliminary investigation, the Chief
Prosecutor contacted the "relevant States" to seek information from
them, as well as seeking data from key NGOs. 136 While ultimately
concluding that his office did not have jurisdiction with regard to
"non-State Party" nationals (i.e., the United States), the Prosecutor
did describe a thorough analytical process that his office conducted
137
with regard to those nationals over which jurisdiction existed.
Although the Prosecutor found no evidence of genocide or the
targeting of civilians-partly due to a lack of information-he did find
a "reasonable basis" to believe willful killing and inhuman treatment
of civilians had occurred. 138
The Prosecutor ultimately chose,
however, not to initiate an investigation into these crimes due to
"gravity" considerations under the Rome Statute, which seemed to
13 9
require more victims than were present in this situation.
Further, unlike the broad discretion to dismiss claims brought
under universal jurisdiction laws in countries such as Germany and
Belgium, 140 the Chief Prosecutor does not have the luxury to ignore

133.
See ANNEX, supra note 125, § I(B).
134.
International Criminal Court, Office of the
Organisation, Procedure, http://www.icc-cpi.intlorgans/otp.html.
135.

Prosecutor,

General

See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, LETTER

DATED FEB. 9, 2006 [hereinafter IRAQ RESPONSE] (available at www.icc-cpi.int).
136.
Id. at 2-3.
137.
See id. at 3, 6, 8.
138.
Id. at 8.
139.
Id. at 8-9.
140.
See infra notes 166-76 and accompanying text (noting Germany and
Belgium's restraint in dropping cases brought under universal jurisdiction). Even
though Germany's system provides its prosecutors with great discretion, German
lawyers have argued that the courts should force the prosecutor to conduct

2006]

WHO'S AFRAID OF THE BIG BAD WOLF?

potential violations for political reasons. Instead, the Rome Statute
provides an easily met criterion to trigger the Chief Prosecutor's
obligation to initiate a formal investigation: he "shall . . . initiate an
investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable
basis to proceed under" the statute. 141 This text makes the initiation
of investigations the default position except where "no reasonable
basis" exists-a low standard indeed. 142 The statute gives the Chief
Prosecutor an "out" based on three factors. 143 The third and most
interesting factor allows the Chief Prosecutor to refuse to initiate an
investigation where it is "not in the interests of justice"-another
standardless test. 144 But it is doubtful that "justice" would be served
by a prosecutor who determines that trying a U.S. military
commander would be bad diplomacy or politically risky. 14 5 The Chief

investigations. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Torture in Abu-Ghraib: The Complaint
against Donald Rumsfeld under the German Code of Crimes against InternationalLaw,
6 GERMAN L.J. No. 3 (March 2005).
141.
Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 53(1) (emphasis added); see also Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.3, Rules 46-50 (regarding
investigative powers under Article 15 of the Rome Statute).
142.
According to the Chief Prosecutor's policy papers, when information is
received from an individual or NGO, "the test is the same but the starting point is
reversed: the Prosecutor shall not seek to initiate an investigation unless he first
concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed." See ANNEX, supra note 125,
§ I(A). Although this may be a policy determination by the current Chief Prosecutor,
nothing in the statute itself supports this distinction.
143.
First, the Chief Prosecutor must determine whether the information
provides a factual basis to support the allegation that a listed crime has been
committed. See Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 53(1); see also ANNEX, supra note
125, § I(C). Second, the Chief Prosecutor must resolve whether the case would be
admissible before the Court as a matter of complementarity. See Rome Statute, supra
note 23, art. 53(1); see also ANNEX, supra note 125, § I(C). Third, the Chief Prosecutor
may dismiss cases "in the interests of justice." See Rome Statute, supra note 23, art.
53(1); see also ANNEX, supra note 125, § I(C).
144.
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c); see International Criminal Court,
Office of the Prosecutor, Summary of Recommendations Received During the First
Public Hearing of the Office of the Prosecutor:Comments and Conclusions of the Office
of the Prosecutor 6 (2003) [hereinafter Prosecutor Comments] (noting as a major
recommendation the "[d]evelopment of clear criteria according to which decisions to
take no further action are taken 'in the interests of justice"), http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/ph/ph1 conclusions.pdf.
145.
Other situations also call into question what standard should be used. For
instance, if a nation chose to form a 'Truth and Reconciliation Committee," should the
Chief Prosecutor defer investigation in the interests of justice? South Africa's Truth
and Reconciliation Committee was formed to negotiate a transition from apartheid to
democratic government. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, The Role of Forgiveness in the Law, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1347, 1357 (2000). All parties agreed that in most cases there
would be no punishment for evil acts under the previous government. See id. In
making a full confession and accepting responsibility, most wrongdoers were granted
amnesty.
See id.; see also Evelyn Bradley, In Search of Justice: A Truth in
Reconciliation Commission for Rwanda, 7 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 129 (1998) (suggesting a
symbolic number of prosecutions of those most culpable for committing genocide may
satisfy international obligations, especially where an overly extensive trial program
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Prosecutor is not a statesman but an independent entity sworn to
bring violators of serious international crimes to justice. Information
against Americans will not be ignored.
The proprio motu structure sets up a system that can be
manipulated by future asymmetric warriors to produce the type of
judicial meddling that will help achieve their objectives. Is there any
doubt that an enemy of the United States could fashion a
"reasonable" argument about potential U.S. violations? Examples
abound where adversaries have manipulated facts and images to
146
present a compelling image of the U.S. war machine gone astray.
How is the Chief Prosecutor to determine whether or not a military
commander's decision to strike a target such as a mosque-allegedly
used by terrorists as a hideout-was a valid target? Is it sufficient to
find a destroyed mosque that is admittedly a target of U.S. weaponry?
Must there be some evidence of wrongdoing beyond this? Will the
Prosecutor be required to conduct preliminary interviews with
commanders and witnesses? If so, what effect will this type of
judicial meddling have on the United States' ability to wage its war
on terror?
Supporters of the Court often cite procedural safeguards that
would thwart the efforts of a politicized Chief Prosecutor, implying
that U.S. concerns are "much ado about nothing.' 1 47 For instance, in
exercising the proprio motu investigation power, the Chief Prosecutor
must submit all supporting data that a crime has been committed to
a Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court. 148 This chamber, composed of
three judges of the Court, 14 9 must decide by majority vote whether it

will threaten stability). Should the Chief Prosecutor defer investigation if these
commissions excuse military and political leaders, also?
146.
See infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text (discussing examples of
NGO allegations).
147.
Mysak, supra note 32, at 286 (discussing safeguards). The phrase "much
ado about nothing' comes from Shakespeare's same-titled comedy.
WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING (1598).

148.
See Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 15(3). The Chief Prosecutor must
involve the Pre-Trial Chamber only when he "concludes that there is a reasonable basis
to proceed with an investigation." Id. art. 15(3). Up to that point, the Chief Prosecutor
is acting on the duty to "analyze the seriousness of the information received." Id. art.
15(2).
149.
See id. art. 39(2)(b)(iii). The Pre-Trial Chamber consists of "not less than
six judges" from various Member States, none of whom may be sympathetic to aims of
the United States in its war on terror. Id. art. 39(1) (outlining numbers of judges in
each chamber). Indeed, as few as one judge may authorize many decisions under the
statute. See id. art. 39(2)(b)(iii) ("The functions of the Pre-Trial Chamber shall be
carried out either by three judges of the Pre-Trial Division or by a single judge of that
division in accordance with this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence."). A
"majority of its judges" (i.e., two), however, must act on issues "under articles 15
[initiating official investigations], 18 [deferring to a State's investigation], 19
[jurisdictional issues], 54(2) [conducting investigations on a State's territory], 61(7)
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will authorize the investigation by finding a "reasonable basis" to
proceed. 150 This standard, however, is as low for the judges as it is
for the Chief Prosecutor. Supporters also cite the requirement that
the Chief Prosecutor and judges be of high moral character and
possess integrity.1 51 Yet these same qualities-coupled with a view of
international law that contradicts U.S. standards-could result in a
bold and courageous ICC that reaches very different conclusions than
U.S. courts. 15 2 Moreover, for the purposes of asymmetric warfare, the
desired objective may be achieved even if the judges eventually decide
not to authorize a formal investigation. 1 53 In the final analysis, the
statutory obligation of the Chief Prosecutor to "pre-investigate" may
be the aspect of the system most prone to abuse.
3. The Dangerous Role of Non-Governmental Organizations
The United States strenuously objected to the proprio motu
power of the Chief Prosecutor, especially the ability to use
information from any source to initiate investigations into alleged
war crimes. 15 4 Instead, the United States would prefer an ICC that
relies on States Parties or the United Nations to initiate
complaints, 155 which would make it less likely for questionable or
politically-motivated investigations to be pursued. The major U.S.
concern is that NGOs with an anti-U.S. agenda will have too much
156
access and influence over the Court's investigative processes.

[whether to confirm charges after a pre-trial hearing], and 72 [protection of national
security information]." Id. art. 57(b).
Compare id. art. 57(2)(a), with id. art. 15(4).
150.
Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 36(3)(a) (stating that judges must have
151.
high integrity); see Mysak, supranote 32, at 286.
See Smidt, supra note 31, at 230 ("The danger in all of this is that a
152.
politically-motivated ICC may be sympathetic to unconventional warfare groups
involved in wars against colonial powers, racist regimes, or alien occupation forces.
Such a court may be supportive of national liberation groups as well.").
For instance, during the conduct of the pre-investigation, deterrence of U.S.
153.
action may be attained, diversion of U.S. resources may be achieved, or demolition of
U.S. credibility in mass media may be accomplished. See infra notes 251-67 and
accompanying text (discussing objectives of terrorists).
See supra notes 125-51 and accompanying text (discussing proprio motu
154.
power).
The Rome Statute does contemplate States Parties referring crimes to the
155.
Chief Prosecutor, as well as referrals from the U.N. Security Council. See Rome
Statute, supra note 23, arts. 13(a)-(b), 14(1).
See SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 97 (noting concern about "an NGO-friendly
156.
litigator with an attitude"). This concern has already been realized. As of February,
2006, the Chief Prosecutor had only received four referrals from States-Parties or the
U.N. Security Council; however, he had received over 1,700 communications from other
sources. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, UPDATE
ON COMMUNICATIONS RECEIVED BYTHE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE ICC

(available at www.icc-cpi.int). Approximately 20% of those complaints warranted
"further analysis" by his office. Id.
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These NGOs may be sympathetic to the political plight of the "weak,"
who have resorted to terrorist measures, or they may simply share
with these asymmetric warriors a common desire to reduce U.S.
hegemony.
As the Court set its course during its first three years in
existence, it appears the U.S. concern about NGO access has been
realized. Early in the process the Chief Prosecutor formed a special
office to coordinate NGO access to the Court. 15 7 The role of NGOs in
bringing "information" for the Chief Prosecutor to "analyse" has also
been formalized; indeed, the Chief Prosecutor has encouraged NGOs
to do some minor level of investigation prior to bringing complaints to
him for the "pre-investigation" stage:
It would not be reasonable to impose upon the senders of
communications [NGOs] the burden of investigating for themselves or
conducting an extensive inquiry for the purpose of sending detailed
information to the Prosecutor. On the other hand, if the information is
too broad and unspecific, it might be impossible for the Office to assess
its value without launching a full investigation .... [T]he preferred
basis for analysis is comparatively
detailed and credible
158
information.

While these processes are still in a developmental stage, the "key
role" of NGOs in the normal process is now built into the institution
of the Court itself. 159 The mechanisms are in place for future
160
asymmetric warriors to exploit this NGO access.
A second U.S. concern is that individuals and NGOs-unlike
nation-states-have no real incentive to show restraint in bringing
complaints to the Chief Prosecutor. As a general rule, fellow nationstates are more cautious when dealing with diplomatically difficult

157.
As one of its first acts, the Office of the Prosecutor established the
Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division (JCCD), with the mandate to
"provide systematic analysis and recommendations on referrals from states and on
communications from citizens and organizations." Hague Address, supra note 106, at
2.
158.
ANNEX, supra note 125, § I(B).
159.
Editorial:ICC Recognizes Key Role of NGOs, ICC NEWSLEtrtER (Int'l Criminal
Court, the Hague, The Netherlands), Aug. 2005, at 8 ('The ICC also recognizes the key
role played by NGOs and the importance of establishing a solid relationship with them.
Regular meetings have served as a framework for an institutionalised dialogue on topical
issues between the Court and NGOs .....
."),
available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/about/newsletter/files/ICC-NL5-200508_En.pdf.
According to the Chief
Prosecutor, "[t]he contribution of non-governmental organizations is crucial to our
work. We are very grateful for their continued assistance and commitment." Hague
Address, supra note 106, at 2. The "Coalition for the ICC ... coordinates our [the
Prosecutor's] work with many of these [NGO] organizations." Id.
160.
The main concern is that terrorist groups with informal ties to NGOs will
feed misinformation to the NGOs, which will bring the claims to a Chief Prosecutor
with a statutory duty to conduct a pre-investigation and inform the accused State
Party. See infra notes 258-67 and accompanying text (discussing the duty to preinvestigate).
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cases, for fear of jeopardizing political alliances and world stability.
It is unlikely, then, that States Parties would frequently raise
questionable claims to the level of the ICC.16 1 Several examples
demonstrate this unwillingness.
Consider the international response when Belgium attempted to
enforce its universal jurisdiction law. 16 2 Prior to the dismissal of
many cases brought under the statute, the small nation felt strong
163
international pressure to reign in its judicial long-arm.
Eventually, Belgium agreed to modify its law, allowing questionable
cases to be diverted to the accused nations. 164 Belgium has since
shown restraint when dealing with new cases. In June 2003, a
lawsuit was filed alleging war crimes in the 2003 invasion of Iraq,
naming high-ranking officials including President George W. Bush
and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. 165 In response, the United
States threatened to suspend funding for a new NATO headquarters
in Brussels, Belgium, and warned that officials would "shun" the

161.
In a 1996 Amnesty International report, the organization made this same
argument, contending that referrals to the ICC by nation-states and the U.N. Security
Council would not be enough:
These two methods are likely to lead to only a limited number of the cases
within the court's jurisdiction which national courts are unable or unwilling to
pursue being investigated or prosecuted by the Prosecutor and to an
unbalanced or biased selection of cases to be brought to the Prosecutor's
attention. There is a risk that few states would bring complaints against
nationals of other states because such complaints might be viewed as infringing
the sovereignty of those states or as interfering with diplomatic relations with
those states.
HALL, supra note 22.
162.
See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (discussing Belgium's
universal jurisdiction laws).
163.
For instance, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell warned Belgium that its
"status as an international hub may be jeopardized" by such lawsuits, despite the fact
that the law gave immunity to heads of state and prime ministers while in office. See
Powell Warns Belgium as Iraqi's File War Crimes Charges, INFORMATION CLEARING
HOUSE, Mar. 19, 2002, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article2334.htm.
World leaders even sought to avoid travel in Belgium for fear of the potential
consequences.
See Amnesty International Memorandum, supra note 100.
For
instance, Israel's Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, refused to travel to Belgium in 2001
due to allegations filed against him for reported war crimes committed in 1982. See id.
164.
See Bart Crols, Belgium to Mend Ties with Washington: PM Verhofstadt,
Offers to Halt Debate on Iraq, Reuters, Sept. 2, 2003 (stating that Belgian Prime
Minister hopes elimination of "politically abused" universal jurisdiction law would
mend damaged relations). See generally Ratner, supra note 103 (discussing Belgium's
universal jurisdiction law); see also supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. The
Belgian law was also modified to require victims of such crimes to live in Belgium for
at least three years. See Fischer-Lescano, supra note 140, at 719.
165.
See War Crimes Charges,supra note 105.

322

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39-29.1

country. 166 Under the modified law, the Belgian Cabinet referred the
167
case to the United States and Britain to investigate.
A similar pattern of restraint occurred in Germany, which
sought to avoid some of Belgium's missteps when passing its own
universal jurisdiction law. 168 In November 2004-in the wake of the
Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal169-four Iraqis filed a German
criminal complaint against U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
and other U.S. officials. 170 The alleged victims claimed Germany's
judiciary was a 'last resort" because it was "clear the U.S.
government is not willing to open an investigation into these
allegations against these officials.' 171 Three months later, the
German prosecutor dismissed the complaint, allowing the United
States to investigate the claim. 172 This was but one of many
examples of German restraint-in the first three years after passage
of the 2002 universal jurisdiction law, the German prosecutor's office
dismissed twenty-six of these types of complaints, refusing to
173
investigate.

166.
Id; see also Fischer-Lescano, supra note 140, at 118 (noting Rumsfeld's
June 2003 comments about removing the NATO headquarters from Belgium).
167.
See War Crimes Charges,supra note 105.
168.
See Gesetz zur EinfUhrung des Volkerstrafgesetzbuches [Act to Introduce
the Code of Crimes Against International Law] June 26, 2002, BGBl. I at 6 (defining
war crimes prosecutable under Germany's universal jurisdiction law).
169.
In 2004, photographs of U.S. soldiers allegedly abusing Iraqi prisoners
shocked the collective conscience of the world, severely undermining the U.S. war effort
in Iraq. See Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at
42.
Numerous subsequent investigations implicated lower ranking personnel in
prisoner abuse, but characterized the incidents as isolated and not reflective of U.S.
policy. See id.
170.
See Andreas Fischer-Lescano, supra note 140 (describing the German
lawsuit brought by an American human rights organization). The criminal indictment
and other pleadings filed at the German Federal Prosecutor's Office are available at,
www.ccrny.org/v2/legal/september_1 lth/septl lArticle.asp?ObjID=lxiADJOOQx&Conte
nt=472. The complaint was ultimately dismissed by German prosecutors on the
grounds of subsidiarity.
The German prosecutor's decision is also available at,
www.ccrny.org/v2/legal/september_ 1lth/septl lArticle.asp?ObjID=lxiADJOOQx&Conte
nt=472. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE? COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE U.S. ABUSE OF DETAINEES (2005) (discussing CCR v.
Rumsfeld), availableat http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/usO4O5/usO405.pdf.
171.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 170 (quoting the complaint). After
German prosecutors dismissed the Abu Ghraib case, Iraqi and Afghan civilians who
were alleged victims of torture and abuse filed suit against Secretary Rumsfeld and
other military commanders in U.S. federal district court. Id. They alleged that
Rumsfeld "ordered the torture and abuse of detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan and that
he failed to stop the torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment even after
credible reports of such treatment began to emerge in the media and in military
documents." Id.
172.
See Daryl Lindsey, Dead-End for War Crimes Accusations: German
Prosecutor Won't Pursue Rumsfeld Case, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Feb. 10, 2005,
http://service.spiegel.de/cache.international/0,1518,341131,00.html.
173.
See Fischer-Lescano, supra note 140, at 1.
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On the other hand, there is virtually no incentive for NGOs to
show restraint in raising cases to the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC.
Indeed, the already high number of NGO communications to the ICC
and the plethora of cases brought under universal jurisdiction laws
indicate that individuals and NGOs will use a similar tactic against
the United States at the ICC--once it is a stable bureaucracy' 74-if
the United States were to consent to the Court's jurisdiction. These
groups would have little to lose and everything to gain; their
complaints could provide an opportunity to harness world attention
through mass media and bring international scrutiny upon U.S.
175
actions, even if the allegations are ultimately unsubstantiated.
An NGO's desire to promote its own reputation should provide
some incentive to raise only the most legitimate complaints; yet,
major NGOs such as Amnesty International 176 have frequently made
allegations of human rights abuses against the United States without
regard to the organization's credibility. 177 It recently branded the
detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay a human rights failure by
calling it "the gulag of our time.' 178 In its annual report, the
organization went on to accuse the United States of sanctioning
interrogation techniques in violation of the Convention Against
80
Torture. 179 Similarly, some Arab and Palestinian advocacy NGOs'

See supra note 111 (describing fragility of new ICC).
174.
175.
See supra notes 77-91 and accompanying text (discussing asymmetric
exploitation of mass media).
176.
Amnesty International is a self-proclaimed "[w]orldwide movement of
people who campaign for internationally recognized human rights." Amnesty.org,
About Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/aboutai-index-eng.
177.
See Smidt, supra note 31, at 201 ("While certainly the majority of [NGOs]
are motivated by just and noble causes, there is room for concern that some may
become so personally and politically involved, that their collection and presentation of
evidence should be suspect.").
178.
Paisley Dodds, Amnesty International Takes Aim at U.S., ASSOCIATED
PRESS, May 25, 2005.
179.
See Amnesty International, Report 2005, United States of America,
http://web.amnesty.orglreport2005/usa-summary-eng. It also criticized the United States'
"secret" detentions of detainees and its decision to have the "military investigat[e] itself,"
charging that investigators lacked the power to examine the highest levels of government.
Id. Human Rights Watch, another watchdog NGO, has made similar allegations. See,
U.S.: Military Commissions Changes are 'Cosmetic- Commissions Should be Scrapped for
Regular Courts, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS, Aug. 31, 2005 (charging
that the military commissions established at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are fatally flawed
as they do not meet international minimums for fair trials), http://www.hrw.org/english/
docs/2005/08/31/usdoml 1671.htm.
180.
The proliferation of NGOs that have taken an active interest in the "ArabIsraeli" conflict is staggering, as one organization, NGO Monitor, lists over seventy-five
NGOs on that one issue alone. See NGO Monitor, Human Rights NGOs, Arab Israeli
Conflict, http://www.ngo-monitor.org/archives/infofile.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
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are even more willing to make claims that will bring international
media attention and potential investigation by the ICC. 181
In sum, the ICC is empowered with a broad mandate that sets it
apart from any global court in history. One hundred nations of the
world have entrusted it with a significant slice of national sovereignty
and have empowered it to prosecute nationals of any state for crimes
that occur any time in the indefinite future.' 8 2 Its Chief Prosecutor
has been given the duty to analyze information he receives from
individuals and NGOs, and to initiate an investigation whenever
83
there is a reasonable basis to believe a violation has occurred.'
agendas-have
anti-U.S.
clear
with
NGOs-some
Finally,
unprecedented access' 8 4 to the Chief Prosecutor's ear and little
incentive to show restraint before raising complaints for his
attention.
This is a recipe for asymmetric warfare; the risk increases every
day that the ICC grows in strength and stature. As part of a broad
asymmetric strategy, adversaries of the United States could feed the
Chief Prosecutor credible misinformation (i.e., exaggerated or false
information) through the access given to NGOs by the Court. The
chain of exploitation will have begun.
B. Exploiting Questionable or FraudulentClaims of U.S. Violations
With the growing possibility that the processes of the ICC can be
manipulated, three types of claims against the United States are
possible: legitimate, exaggerated, or fraudulent. Clearly, the most
compelling complaints that can be brought are those stemming from
genuine U.S. violations of international law. The facts and moral
high ground would merge in such a case to bring the most pressure to
For supporters of the ICC, this scenario
change U.S. policies.
provides the strongest argument for the United States to ratify the
treaty-the Court would provide a real check on the temptation of the
United States to abuse its superpower status to achieve national

numerous
conflict has spawned
(Palestinian)-Israeli
181.
The Arab
organizations battling to get their political messages out. For example, the Defence for
Children International (Palestinian Section) maintains a running tally of children
killed and being detained by Israel, yet fails to account for the number of Israeli
Defence for Children International, Palestinian
children killed by Palestinians.
Section, http://www.dci-pal.org/english/home.cfm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).

182.

See CICC, supra note 118.

See Rome Statute, supra note 23, arts. 15(2).
183.
See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text (analyzing NGO access to
184.
Chief Prosecutor); see also Prosecutor Comments, supra note 144, at 5 (outlining a
recommendation to establish a "permanent but flexible framework for interaction with
individuals, academics, scholars, lecturers, women's and children's rights practitioners
and non-governmental organisations" and establish "guidelines to assist nongovernmental organisations in determining their appropriate role .... ).
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of
objectives. Indeed, some have already accused the United 1States
85
doing exactly that in its present conduct of the war on terror.
But the potential for misuse is high. In warfare there will
always be collateral damage-dead civilians and destroyed
In the famous words of General
infrastructure are inevitable.
Tecumseh Sherman, "War is hell.' 18 6 But adversaries of the United
States are likely to take any opportunity to accuse the United States
of committing war crimes, even where political and military leaders
have made all necessary efforts to minimize such damage-an ideal
87
asymmetric weapon.'
1. Investigating Questionable Claims of U.S. War Crimes
U.S. officials do not fear genuine violations of international law;
their true concern is that every tragedy of the U.S. war on terror will
become the subject of a high-profile international criminal
investigation.188 The Chief Prosecutor also began "analyzing six
situations ... located in four different continents" as well as a
thorough analysis of over 240 complaints stemming from the 2003
Iraq War. 18 9 These statistics will only grow. The Chief Prosecutor's
statutory duty to analyze all information-combined with increasing
access by NGOs that have little incentive to show restraint-could be
subverted to serve a future asymmetric cause.19 0
Perhaps the greatest U.S. concern involves the collateral damage
that will inevitably result in any violent conflict due to the "fog of

185.
See supra notes 170-75, 232-34 and accompanying text (noting accusations
against the United States).
186.

BASIL HENRY LIDDELL HART, SHERMAN: SOLDIER, REALIST, AMERICAN 310

(1993).
For an excellent discussion of hypothetical situations where States Parties
187.
might try to initiate action in the ICC against U.S. personnel, see Joel F. England, The
Response of the United States to the International Criminal Court: Rejection,
Ratification or Something Else?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 941, 951-62 (2001).

188.
See Smidt, supra note 31, at 197 (noting the ICC's procedure for referring
cases was "the most dangerous aspect of the Rome Statute" that would provide
"significant opportunity for politically-based prosecutions"); see also England, supra
note 187, at 975 (arguing that the United States has interest in ensuring U.S. military
members serving in foreign lands are not subject to arbitrary or capricious trials that
seek to change foreign policy rather than obtain justice).
See Hague Address, supra note 106 (acknowledging statistics but unable to
189.
In January 2005, the Chief Prosecutor
reveal details due to confidentiality).
acknowledged "analyzing several other situations that have been brought to the
attention of the Prosecutor by individuals and groups." Press Release, International
Criminal Court, Prosecutor Receives Referral Concerning Central African Republic
(Jan. 7, 2005), www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/87.html; see also IRAQ RESPONSE,

supra note 135.
190.
See supra notes 125-60 and accompanying text (discussing proprio motu
power and NGO access).
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war." 191 Asymmetric warriors hiding themselves among the civilian
population will often benefit from maximum collateral damage and
its accompanying public outcry. 192 Even the bombing of valid targets
could be exploited. For instance, in the 2001 coalition attacks in
Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden charged the United States with a war
crime based on the bombing of a mosque by a malfunctioning guided
193
missile.
A classic example of asymmetrically exploiting the tragedy of
collateral damage occurred during the 1991 Gulf War when the
United States used precision guided munitions to destroy the Al
Firdos bunker in Baghdad-a high-value target considered to be one
of ten secondary leadership bunkers. 194 After the bombing, however,
Iraqi sources claimed that hundreds of civilians had been killed in the
attack, including over 100 children. 19 5 Unbeknownst to the United
States, Iraq had housed the families of high-ranking civilians above
the bunker either to provide them extra safety or to use as human
shields. 19 6 Public outrage against the attack-and charges of war
crimes-immediately followed. 197 The United States altered its
bombing strategy after this incident to avoid such tragedies for the
duration of the war, 198 but the damage could not be undone.
Exploitation of this tragedy continued to be a tool of asymmetric "lawfare" as late as 2002 in a lawsuit filed under Belgium's universal
jurisdiction laws. 19 9

191.
Jefferson D. Reynolds, CollateralDamage on the 21st Century Battlefield:
Enemy Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High
Ground, 56 A.F. L. REV. 1, 88-91 (2005) ("Traditionally, collateral damage is a result of
weapon system malfunction, human error, desperation in the fog of war or because it
was intended.").
192.
See id. at 88 (noting a trend in recent conflicts).
193.

[The United States] hit what they claimed to be al-Quaida positions in
Khost and dropped a guided missile at a mosque. They said that this was
a mistake. After investigations, it was confirmed that the ulema were
reciting their Ramadan night prayers ....
They bombarded the mosque
while the Muslims were praying, killing 150.

SeptemberlNews.com, Osama bin Laden Speeches, Dec. 26, 2001 (quoting Mr. bin
Laden), http://www.septemberllnews.com/OsamaSpeeches.htm.
But see John
Lancaster & Vernon Loeb, U.S. Forces Engaging Taliban in Combat, WASH. POST, Nov.
17, 2001, at A-1 (documenting the bombing and noting that the Pentagon attributed
the mishap to a "guidance malfunction").
194.
For a complete discussion of the facts and consequences of the Al Firdos
incident, see O'Halloran, supra note 49, at 24-25 (outlining facts as reported in this
paragraph).
195.
Id. at 24.
196.
Id.
197.
Id. at 25.
198.
See id. at 26 ("[T]argeting strategies changed literally overnight in the
wake of the Al Firdos bombing.").
199.
This was one of the lawsuits ultimately dismissed by the Belgian courts.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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Though collateral damage is inevitable, assessing its probability
can be difficult.
Even among coalition allies there is often
disagreement about what constitutes appropriate targeting; such
decisions become even more controversial when considering dual-use
facilities, 20 0 such as the Al Firdos bunker. Moreover, incidents where
the expected collateral damage exceeds military necessity could lead
to actionable charges under the Rome Statute. 20 1 But are judges and
prosecutors of the ICC-who are not required to possess a military
background or expertise in application of the laws of war 2 02-in the
best position to evaluate these difficult determinations?
If the United States were a party to the ICC, every tragedy of
collateral damage could potentially result in allegations of crimes
against high-ranking U.S. officials. 208
In practice, to avoid ICC
jurisdiction and receive the protection of complementarity, 20 4 the
United States would prudently conduct full investigations in every
instance of civilian loss. These internal investigations would require

200.
201.

See Reynolds, supra note 191, at 84.
See Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 8(2)(b)(iv) (defining as a war crime:

[ilntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilians or
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.)
202.
Although the statute does not strictly require this expertise, some expertise
in the relevant area is needed. See id., art. 36(3)(b)(i)-(ii) (requiring judges have
established competence in relevant areas of criminal law or international law such as
international humanitarian law and law of human rights, but not requiring expertise
in laws of war); see also SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 152:
The Statute requires a degree of expertise in the subject matter of the Court.
Here it creates two categories of candidates, those with criminal law experience
and those with international law experience ....

[A] minimum of nine judges

must come from the criminal law profile and a minimum of five from the
international law profile.
203.
Note, however, that "crimes against humanity" require acts "committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack." Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 7(1). Similarly, "war
crimes" require acts "committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes." Id. art. 8(1). This language suggests a high bar for
consideration by the Court; however, it is unlikely a U.S. incident will involve a
solitary attack in a vacuum. Such acts are often part of a larger plan against an enemy
such as Al Quaida.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and
Judgment, 649 (May 7, 1997). As one ICTY decision has stated, a "single act by a
perpetrator taken within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population entails individual criminal responsibility and an individual
perpetrator need not commit numerous offenses to be held liable." Id.; see also
England, supra note 187, at 956-57 (suggesting that NATO's Kosovo bombing
campaign could satisfy the aggregate requirements set forth in the Rome Statute).
204.
See infra notes 276-84 and accompanying text (discussing complementarity
and its ramifications).
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interviews with high-level officials (potentially the Secretary of
Defense and President) about their role in the attack decision, the
intelligence available at the time, and the chain of command's
operation during the incident. In many cases, critics would not be
satisfied that the United States conducted a truly "impartial"
20 5
investigation.
Additionally troubling is how the ICC may come to view itself.
While ICTY cases are not binding on the ICC, in the Tadic Appeal on
Jurisdictionthe tribunal stated:
It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for
justice, should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised
successfully against human rights. Borders should not be considered as
a shield against the reach of the law and as a protection for those who
trample underfoot the most elementary rights of humanity.... [When
an] international tribunal such as the present one is created, it must be
206
endowed with primacy over national courts.

While only dicta, this statement reflects a growing sentiment that
international courts must have primacy over state sovereignty. In
the future, when the ICC becomes a stable bureaucracy, it may raise
enough political capital to confront the world's most sovereign
20 7
nation-the United States.

For instance, in the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal, the United States
205.
undertook a full investigation. Of the numerous investigations that looked into the
prisoner abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib, the report by Major General Antonio Taguba
received the most attention. But even after certain individuals were prosecuted, critics
charged the United States with conducting a sham investigation. Perhaps the most
surprising review came from Captain Lisa Weidenbush, an Army operations officer
with the 800th Military Police Brigade-the unit that ran the prison and took the
brunt of General Taguba's criticism. See Edward T. Pound, A Dissent from Within the
Ranks, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 21, 2004, at 66. In a scathing twenty-five-page
report, Captain Weidenbush wrote, "I submit that the report was a conclusion in search
of an investigation. .. and not an investigation seeking truth." Id. This sentiment was
echoed by Sergeant Charles Graner, one of the Army prison guards convicted at a
court-martial, who alleged that officers in charge of the prison were aware of the
maltreatment and that military intelligence officers were present for the abuse. See
England Sentenced to Three Years, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 28, 2005,
Human Rights Watch was
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,170655,00.html.
especially critical of the Taguba Report, calling for a Special Prosecutor. See HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 170 ("Because there is no realistic possibility that the U.S.
Attorney General or the U.S. military will investigate these senior leaders for the
crimes described above, the appointment of a special prosecutor is warranted.").
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Deference Motion for
206.
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 58 (Oct. 2, 1995).
207.
Consider how the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IAHCR)
of the Organization of American States (OAS) has confronted the United States with
regard to the alleged torture of detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Although the United
States has ignored rulings from this "court" before-it has never consented to the
court's jurisdiction-in 2002 the IAHCR "ordered" the United States to take
"precautionary measures" to ensure that detainees were not entitled to status as
prisoners of war, and expressed concern that the United States might be torturing the
detainees. See Center for Constitutional Rights, Docket: Petition to Inter-American
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Confronting the United States will be made easier by the fact
that European prosecutors have already investigated potential U.S.
208
war crimes. During NATO operations in Kosovo, Carla Del Ponte,
20 9
"looked into complaints regarding
Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY,
NATO's bombing campaign in Yugoslavia. She met with individuals
from the Russian Duma, various non-governmental agencies, and
2 10
international legal experts to discuss NATO's actions in Kosovo."
This step came after human rights groups argued that investigation
of potential NATO war crimes was "essential if the Hague tribunals
were to be seen as impartial. ''2 11 A similar process is occurring with
Council of Europe
investigations by the European Parliament and the 212
into the possibility of secret U.S. prisons in Europe.
The ICC's Chief Prosecutor will experience similar political
pressures to investigate questionable claims of war crimes allegedly
committed by entities such as NATO or the United States. Unlike
the ICTY's Prosecutor, however, the ICC's Chief Prosecutor has broad
investigative obligations2 13 and almost universal international
support. 2 14 This institutional structure might create a global "Ken

Commission on Human Rights on Behalf of the Guantanamo Detainees,
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/septemberl lthlseptl lArticle.asp?ObjID=7ltOqaX9CP&
Content=134. The U.S. experience with the IAHCR seems to affirm the fear that a
ratified and fully empowered ICC could take the same stance.
Mrs. Del Ponte is a Swiss lawyer who was the third prosecutor to head the
208.
ICTY. At a Glance, supra note 114. She has stated, "nobody is above the law or beyond
the reach of international justice." Id.
209.
See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (explaining the ICTY).
See Smidt, supra note 31, at 220.
210.
Robin Oakley, Del Ponte Condemns Yugoslav Stand, Jan 26, 2001,
211.
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/01/26/davos.un/. Mrs. Del Ponte initially
resisted these requests because she explained that allegations against NATO were "not
my priority" compared with the "thousands of bodies" of war crime victims from former
Serbian officials such as Slobodan Milosevic. Id. A confidential report was prepared by
an internal committee of the ICTY that was created to advise the Chief Prosecutor on
whether a formal investigation was required. See Danner, supra note 117, at 539
The committee ultimately recommended that an
(discussing the incident).
investigation was not required and the Chief Prosecutor chose to follow the report's
recommendation. See id. Critics debated whether the preliminary investigation
detracted from the impartiality of the ICTY or was biased in favor of NATO. See id.
The ICC's Chief Prosecutor will certainly be confronted by these kinds of charges also,
and will look to the ICTY experience for guidance.
212.
See Dan Bilefsky, EU Terror Chief Lacks Proof of CIA Prisons, INT'L
HERALD TRIBUNE, Apr. 20, 2006.
See supra notes 128-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Chief
213.
Prosecutor's statutory duty to investigate). Moreover, the Office of the Prosecutor has
a broad ability to investigate crimes within other nations' borders. See Int'l Criminal
Court, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, at 9 (2003),
[hereinafter Policy
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy-Paper.pdf
Paper] ("[A] variable number of investigation teams, the size and composition of which
will also fluctuate . . . . Investigation teams will include staff members who are
nationals of the countries targeted by the investigations.").
214.
Policy Paper,supra note 213, at 9.
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Starr" problem that could be exploited by modern asymmetric
215
warriors to achieve their objectives.
2. Inventing Fraudulent Claims of U.S. War Crimes
While questionable claims may provide the opportunity to exploit
the ICC, policymakers also fear a less frequent but more devastating
asymmetric tactic: creating fraudulent claims of U.S. violations out of
whole cloth. Adversaries of the United States could perpetrate this
fraud on the ICC in two ways: (1) placing innocent civilians at highpriority targets to create heavy civilian casualties from U.S. attacks,
and (2) committing war crimes while disguised as using troops in
order to "frame" the United States, or both.
Regarding the first possibility, consider again the Al Firdos
216
Out of
bunker incident during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
malevolence or sheer stupidity, the Iraqis placed families of highranking military leaders in harms way in the upper floors of a bunker
which was also a high-priority leadership target. 217 Its destructionand accompanying civilian loss-resulted in both propaganda and
legal opportunities. 218 In addition, modern adversaries are willing to
use innocent civilians to raise the stakes on U.S. attacks. For
instance, Libya "threatened to surround the reported site of an
underground chemical plant with 'millions of Muslims' in order to
ward off attacks. ' 219 Since modern terrorists have no regard for
innocent human life, they would not hesitate to use this same tactic if
an asymmetric gain could be achieved. Indeed, U.S. officials predict
that future enemies will likely disperse "military assets into civilian
areas in the hopes of causing collateral damage" that can be
"trumpeted to the world media.., all in the hopes of dissuading

215.
Professor Michael P. Scharf humorously highlighted this point to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee when he testified that some U.S. officials fear
that an independent ICC Prosecutor would lead to an "international Ken Starr
problem." Seguin, supra note 20, at 100 (noting that even with safeguards, the United
States still fears a politically motivated Prosecutor could unfairly target the United
States). Ken Starr is a U.S. lawyer and former judge who was appointed as an
Independent Counsel to investigate President Bill Clinton's Whitewater land
transactions. He submitted the Starr Report to Congress, which led to President
Clinton's impeachment on charges arising from the Monica Lewinsky perjury and sex
scandal. He was criticised by some for expanding the scope of his investigation too far
and abusing prosecutorial powers. For a history and discussion of the role of the
independent prosecutor in America, see generally Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent
Counsel: A View From Inside, 86 GEO. L.J. 2307 (1998).
216.
See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text (discussing the Al Firdos
incident).
217.
See id.
218.
See id.
219.
Dunlap, supra note 66, at 79 (quoting Libyans to Form Shield at Suspected
Arms Plant, BALT. SUN, May 17, 1996, at 14).
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attacks by compassionate Americans concerned for the fate of those
'22 0
who might be unintentionally killed.
Regarding the second possibility, the idea of "framing" the
United States for war crimes will appeal to asymmetric adversaries,
but only if they can achieve it successfully. This is no idle fear:
during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, reports surfaced that U.S. military
uniforms had been stolen; insurgents intended to use those uniforms
22 1
to pose as U.S. military members and commit war atrocities.
These tactics have also been used in the past. Colombian kingpin
rebels may have intimidated peasants to bring false claims against
key military leaders. 222 Further, some believe Rwanda and Uganda
used this tactic to garner world sympathy by feeding "the media and
NGOs false stories on military operations and atrocities in Zaire. '223
Finally, one fictional account envisions a future U.S. defeat where an
unscrupulous enemy detonates a nuclear weapon on his own soil
during a conventional U.S. air strike to convince the world media that
224
the United States has engaged in the most grievous of war crimes.
Consider this potential future scenario concerning the ICC.
Terrorists posing as U.S. troops would commit war atrocities. These
crimes would be witnessed by actual victims who may truly believe
that the United States has carried out the offenses. Reports would
surface, with the corresponding negative media publicity. When
evidence of the crimes reached the ICC, the Chief Prosecutor would
have no choice but to conduct an initial inquiry. The media attention
and propaganda effort would intensify. Regardless of any U.S.
investigation into the incident-which would likely find no evidence
of U.S. involvement-the pressure on the ICC to formally investigate
this "clear evidence" of U.S. atrocities would be overwhelming. A
well-done "framing" of this sort could pose serious threats to
international support of the U.S. war on terror. While this scenario is
currently but a work of fiction, it is notable that after the dramatic
attacks on September 11, 2001, the Pentagon quickly consulted

220.
Id. at 79-80.
221.
At the start of the invasion, a U.S. military official reported that Iraq was
"acquiring military uniforms 'identical down to the last detail' to those worn by
American and British forces and plans to use them to shift blame for atrocities."
Official: Iraqis Plan Atrocities in U.S. Uniforms, FOXNEWS.COM, Mar. 7, 2003,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,80332,00.html. Saddam Hussein was reported to
have given his Fedayeen Saddam troops instructions to commit "reprisals against the
Iraqi people so that they could pass the atrocities off as the work of the United States
and the United Kingdom." Id.
222.
See O'Grady, supra note 91, at A17.
223.
Rhodes, supra note 69, at 11.
224.
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007, THE
WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 29, 1996, at 22.

332

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39:.291

Hollywood to help "dream up terrorist scenarios for the post- 9/11
2 25
world."
Therefore, whether by exaggerating the tragedies of war or by
creating fraudulent violations of international law, asymmetric
warriors may be able to exploit the processes of the ICC. Whether
such claims are eventually substantiated or not, the chain of events
that these investigations--or even pre-investigations-will set in
2 26
motion can help accomplish asymmetric objectives.
C. Exploiting the InternationalCriminal Court through Use of Mass
Media
The practice of "media warfare" works hand-in-hand with the
type of asymmetric exploitation of the ICC that could occur in the
future.
As the world's only remaining superpower, anti-U.S.
sentiment is not difficult to stir, especially after the 2003 U.S.-led
effort to oust Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. There is little doubt
that propaganda throughout the past forty years has fueled
international anti-U.S. sentiment. "Among intellectuals and media of
Western Europe and the third world, a strong anti-U.S. bias has been
prevalent. There is a large and well prepared market for the worst
2 27
possible stories about American military action."
This sets the stage for various asymmetric tactics. Those who
oppose U.S. policies and actions have a built-in media audience for
whom to conduct show trials in the fashion of the resoundingly
successful Russell Tribunal during the Vietnam conflict. 228
For
instance, a Japanese "International Criminal Tribunal for Iraq"made up of a four-lawyer panel conducting a "people's tribunal" with
no legal effect-found President Bush and Prime Minister Blair
guilty of numerous war crimes. 229 These "show trials" have become

225.
Robert F. Howe, Star Wars to Real Wars, READERS DIGEST, Oct. 2004,
http://tinyurl.comzlejz ('Military analysts were methodical, but proved to be
constricted by a slavish devotion to real-world specs. By contrast, the only boundary
Hollywood knew was the limit of its imagination."). "The 9111 Commission Report" also
faulted the government for its "failure of imagination." NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE

9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 336 (2004),

available at http://www.9-1 lcommission.gov/report/ index.htm.
226.
See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing terrorists' asymmetric objectives).
227.
O'Halloran, supra note 49, at 14 (citing JAMES S. CORUM, INFLATED BY AIR:
COMMON

PERSPECTIVES

OF

CIVILIAN

CASUALTIES

FROM

BOMBING

25

(1998),

http://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ayl998/awc/98-080.pdf).
228.
See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (explaining the Russell
Tribunal).
229.
Julian Ryall, Lawyers'PanelIndicts Bush, Blair, AL JAZEERA, Mar. 7, 2005,
http://english.aljazeera.net[NRexeres/D8ClC363-308C41F7-8B32-935312621768.htm
("Bush is guilty of genocide for use of 'devastating' economic sanctions, as well as war
crimes for attacks against civilians and the use of indiscriminate weapons, such as
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common since the war on terror began. 230 But the mass media
bedlam that has evolved since the Russell Tribunal of the 1960s
makes this type of "show trial" more of a curiosity than a true media
event today-such stories often get lost in the chaos.
As with
complaints filed under universal jurisdiction laws in countries such
as Belgium and Germany, these legal feigns lack any real significance
because they pose no real threat to the United States or its
2 31
officials.
But imagine the media interest in a case that could potentially
lead to the international criminal prosecution of U.S. military leaders
or high-level political figures. 232 If the United States joins the ICC
and consents to its jurisdiction, complaints lodged before the Court
would pose a true threat-with the corresponding media circus. The
Chief Prosecutor would conduct a "pre-investigation" according to his
statutory duty, possibly even taking "written or oral testimony at the
seat of the Court. '233 Failure to satisfy the Chief Prosecutor could
result in a court order that the United States could not ignore as it
has done with lesser courts. 234 The nation could even draw the ire of

cluster bombs and depleted uranium weapons. The attack on Falluja also makes him
guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity.").
230.
For instance, in a lawsuit filed by Filipino and foreign lawyers before
another "people's tribunal" in 2002, President Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair,
and other world leaders were accused of conducting a "war of aggression" against Iraq.
Dabet Castafieda, GMA, Bush to Face War Crimes Tribunal, INDEPENDENT MEDIA
CENTER, Mar. 20, 2004, http://wc.open-publishing.be/news/2004/03/282.php.
The
lawsuit accused the "defendants" of "undermining the UN and preventing it from
carrying through its professed role of establishing and maintaining peace in the world."
Id. Similarly, Akira Maeda, a Tokyo Zokei University professor, organized a 2003 civic
tribunal with eleven prosecutors that "indicted" President George W. Bush for war
crimes against the Afghan people. Bush 'Indicted'Over War Crimes, THE JAPAN TIMES,
July 1, 2003. The "indictment" charged Bush with "aggression, attacks against
civilians and nonmilitary facilities, and the torturing and execution of prisoners." Id.
231.
See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (discussing lack of impact of
these lawsuits).
232.
Many high-profile cases have generated high international media interest.
In 1994, there was extensive media coverage when a Singaporean court sentenced a
U.S. teenager to six strokes of a rattan cane and four months in prison for spraypainting cars in Singapore. See Charles P. Wallace, Singapore Blasts Back at Clinton
in Caning Case, Los ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 9, 1994, at A4. The sentence was
considered too harsh by the United States and a war of words erupted between the two
nations. See id. Saddam Hussein's upcoming trial has also received much media
attention. See, e.g., John Daniszewski, In Iraq, a Case Without Precedent, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at Al. The Michael Jackson child molestation trial also
garnered worldwide attention. See, e.g., Mark Reynolds, Jacko Will Face Trial: Star on
Sex Charges "Looks Forwardto His Day in Court", DAILY MAIL (London), Apr. 23, 2004,
at 31.
233.
Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 15(2); see also supra notes 128-48 and
accompanying text (discussing statutory duty of Prosecutor).
234.
See supra note 123 (discussing U.S. treatment of the ICJ).
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the ICC in the form of sanctions2 35 if the United States were to
impede the duties of a Court official.23 6 Picture the inherent drama
that would result if the United States chose to defy the ICC-the
headline in USA Today might read: "United States Refuses to Obey
World Court!" Indeed, such a turn of events could jeopardize the very
legitimacy and survival of the Court. 23 7 As an asymmetric strategy,
then, raising alleged grievances before the ICC might prove to be an
effective means to challenge U.S. policy in the "court of mass media."
It could result in the deterrence of U.S. action and the decline of U.S.
prestige.
Even now, critics of the United States have exploited mass media
to take advantage of the unpopular U.S. opposition to the ICC. Those
U.S. critics argue that by the United States' failure to participate in
the Court, it no longer champions the cause of international
justice. 23 8 In the world's eyes, U.S. actions have had a "corrosive
effect" on diplomacy. 23 9 Fueling this fire, the United States' attempt
to secure Article 98 agreements 240 with many countries 241 has led to a
perception exploited in the world media that the United States is
affirmatively acting to undermine the ICC. 242 Attempts to secure
these controversial agreements have garnered negative media
attention and contributed to the image of the U.S. "bully. '243 For
example, President Alfredo Palacios of Ecuador, in refusing to sign an

235.
See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 141, Rule 166 (allowing
sanctions to be imposed for violations of Article 70 of Rome Statute).
236.
See Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 70(1)(d).
237.
This conflict is akin to a U.S. constitutional crisis where the executive
branch refuses to carry out an order of the judicial branch.
238.
The role of the United States as a promoter of global human rights has
been called into question because of this opposition. Telci, supra note 43, at 484.
Given this intense anti-U.S. campaign, one might question whether opposition to the
Court is even more damaging to U.S. interests than if it were a party.
239.
Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 430.
240.
See supra note 108 (explaining Article 98). See generally David Shorr,
Hegemony and its Ideological Blind Spots, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 399, 402-03 (2004)
(discussing the U.S. attempt to secure Article 98 agreements). Pursuant to these
bilateral agreements, each country would agree not to surrender a U.S. national to the
ICC if requested to do so by the Court. Telci, supra note 43, at 474.
241.
By December 2003, sixty-six countries had signed Article 98 agreements
with the United States. Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 425. Many did so under the
threat of losing U.S. aid if the agreements were not signed. Id.
242.
The European Community and Council of Europe have raised concerns that
these immunity deals sought by the United States violate the spirit, if not the express
letter, of Article 98 of the Rome Statute. Id. at 424; see also Jeffrey S. Dietz, Comment,
Protecting the Protectors:Can the United States Successfully Exempt U.S. Persons from
the InternationalCriminal Court with U.S. Article 98 Agreements?, 27 HOuS. J. INT'L L.
137, 179 (2004) (observing that the ICC may find Article 98 agreements invalid); Telci,
supra note 43, at 479 (arguing Article 98 agreements legally unenforceable). But see
Telci, supra note 43, at 466 (noting the idea for agreements encouraged by the
European Union as way for the United States to resolve concerns over the ICC).
243.
See generally Telci, supra note 43.
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Article 98 agreement stated, "Absolutely nobody is going to make me
cower." 244 Not surprisingly, the forces of NGOs have mobilized to
98
monitor and comment in the media on U.S. efforts to secure Article
245
agreements, even influencing ICC State Parties to not sign them.
The current media campaign to soil the reputation of the United
States as a champion of international rights may only be a prelude to
the media symphony that can be conducted to asymmetrically harm
U.S. interests, especially if the United States ratifies the Rome
Treaty. 246 This concern has been affirmed by the Court's outreach to
"media centre" located
mass media by constructing a two-level 247
adjacent to the ICC courtrooms at the Hague.
D. Asymmetric Objectives of Exploiting the InternationalCriminal
Court
Future asymmetric warriors will use various methods to exploit
the ICC, 24 8 but these techniques are not employed for their own sake.
Instead, adversaries of the United States will coordinate these
asymmetric tactics to achieve three main objectives to combat the war
on terror: (1) creating risk-averse behavior by U.S. policymakers and
military leaders, (2) diverting resources and attention from the
primary mission of fighting terrorism, and (3) splitting up
international coalitions that support the war on terror.
1. Creating Risk-Averse Policymakers and Commanders
The primary aim of future asymmetric "law-fare" attacks will be
to deter the United States from "doing good" and aggressively fighting
its war on terror. 249 Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda would relish

Ecuador Refuses to Sign ICC Immunity Deal for US Citizens, SCHOOL OF
244.
THE AMERICAS WATCH, AFP NEWS, June 22, 2005, http://www.soaw.org/new/article.
php?id=1135. Ecuador's refusal to sign the Article 98 agreement will likely cost
Ecuador seventy million dollars of U.S. military aid each year. Id.
See Telci, supra note 43, at 477 (describing the role of NGOs in Article 98
245.
analysis).
Of course, even if the United States never ratifies the treaty, it can
246.
experience similar negative media publicity if the Court chooses to indict a U.S. citizen
despite the nation's "non-party" status. See supra note 110 (pointing out that the ICC
may indict American citizens even if the United States refuses to become a party). The
distinction, however, is that the United States will not have promised to cooperate with
the Court as part of its treaty obligations. See id.
247.

See Media Centre Ready to Accommodate Journalists, ICC NEWSLETTER

(International Criminal Court, the Hague, Neth.), Aug. 2005, at 8 (highlighting
completed construction of new facility), available at http://www.icc-cpi.intflibrary/
about/newsletter/files/ICC-NL5-200508_En.pdf.
See supra Part III.A-C (discussing three methods to exploit the ICC).
248.
249.
See Smidt, supra note 31, at 222 ("Future opponents of the United States
are likely to use 'asymmetrical' warfare in order to attempt to defeat the United States
and its allies."). The United States, however, must be careful in its attempt to "do
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the ability to cow the United States into a defensive posture or one of
complete international isolation. 250 If these groups can prevent U.S.
attacks against them by creating risk-averse decisionmakers, they
will have gone far in neutralizing their primary threat.
Risk-averse behavior begins with the fear of taking risks and
exposing oneself to danger. With regard to the ICC, United States
policymakers are most concerned about the danger to U.S. civilian
251
and military leadership posed by investigations or prosecutions.
While testifying in favor of the ASPA, U.S. Ambassador John Bolton
stated:
Now let us be clear here. Our main concern under the Rome Statute
should not be that the prosecutor will indict the occasional American
soldier who contrary to his or her training and doctrine allegedly
commits a war crime.
Our main concern should be for the
President ...and other senior leaders responsible for our defense and
foreign policy. They are the real potential targets of the ICC's
2 52
politically unaccountable prosecutor.

The mere possibility of an ICC investigation could curtail U.S.
military and peacekeeping activities. 253 Military and civilian leaders
may adopt stricter interpretations of proportionality, reducing the
speed, mass, and dominance that have characterized U.S. military
operations. Considering the relatively subjective nature of wartime
decisions, the United States could choose to operate a conservative
war-fighting plan for fear it will need to defend its decisions to a
civilian court composed of members who may have very different

good" so that policy makers avoid adopting the same tactics used by terrorists, such as
arbitrary detention and the use of aggressive interrogation techniques. See supra
notes 181-82 and accompanying text and infra note 286 (discussing complaints about
alleged U.S. tactics against detainees at Guantanamo Bay).
250.
The United States may be "so averse to taking any casualties that it will
hesitate to react in the face of aggression or massive violations of international
humanitarian law, unless U.S. interests are directly at risk." Smidt, supra note 31, at
224.
251.
This concern is clearly warranted: "[The Office of the Prosecutor] will
initiate prosecutions of the leaders who bear most responsibility for the crimes." Policy
Paper, supra note 213, at 3; see also Prosecutor Comments, supra note 144, at 2 (noting
that this concept received "strong support" at the 2003 Public Hearing).
252.
The International Criminal Court: Hearings before the Comm. on
InternationalRelations H.R., 106th Cong. 6 (2000); see Christopher M. Van de Kieft,
Uncertain Risk: The United States Military and the International Criminal Court, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 2325, 2347 (2002) (discussing comments by John Bolton). Mr. Bolton
testified while serving as a Senior Vice President at the American Enterprise Institute.
He currently serves as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.
253.
See Van de Kieft, supra note 252, at 2336-37 (quoting 1998 comments by
Ambassador David J. Scheffer, arguing that complementarity "is not the answer" to
investigations of peacekeeping operations that have been approved by the U.N. to
enforce international law). But see England, supra note 187, at 958-59 (noting the
argument that bombing in the name of humanitarian intervention is not consistent
with self defense).
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perspectives on the parameters of proportionality. 254 Some might
argue these operational constraints would be a positive development;
however, history has shown that piecemeal efforts in warfare increase
255
risks to all parties involved and are more harmful in the long run.
For instance, the slow buildup of NATO's air campaign in Kosovo
may have contributed to the length of the war and256 resulting loss of
life-an unintended consequence of proportionality.
Recent history provides examples of how asymmetric tactics can
achieve a response from military and political leaders hoping to avoid
negative media publicity. 257 During the 1991 Gulf War, the United
States changed its targeting strategy after the Al Firdos bunker
tragedy resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths. 258 After the massive
civilian casualties, General Norman Schwarzkopf required all
Baghdad targets to be personally approved by him; he also sharply
2 59
limited attacks against other National Command Authorities.
Similar concerns led to military decisions during the December 1998
air strikes in Iraq, dubbed Operation Desert Fox. U.S. military
commanders feared the media's use of images of the air strikes
during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and thus allowed only
strike key Iraqi targets; this mission was almost
four days 2to
"undoable." 6 0 Moreover, when Belgium and other countries began to
use universal jurisdiction laws, U.S. officials 26 1modified their
diplomatic travel schedules to avoid those countries.
These examples reflect an underlying concern repeatedly raised
by officials in the Clinton Administration: "The Rome Statute imposes
a formal equality of law in the face of a radical inequality of exposure:
[w]ith vastly larger military commitments than any other country,
the United States is more likely to have soldiers deployed in conflicts
that may give rise to war crimes charges." 26 2 This concern is well-

254.
255.

See supra note 202 (discussing qualifications of the ICC judges).
William S. Nash, The ICC and the Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces, in

THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 161 (Sarah B. Sewall &

Carl Kaysen eds., 2000).
Id.
256.
See O'Halloran, supra note 49, at 12 ("The United States' sensitivity to
257.
anti-American propaganda can result in changing viable strategies in order to
preemptively defuse enemy propaganda opportunities.").
258.
See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text (discussing the Al Firdos
incident).
259.

See MICHAEL R. GORDON & BERNARD E. TRAINOR, THE GENERALS' WAR 326

(1995) ("[Tjhe Al Firdos raid had accomplished what the Iraqi air defenses could not:
downtown Baghdad was to be attacked sparingly, if at all."); Dunlap, supra note 66, at
78 (citing the Al Firdos bunker incident as the cause of U.S. leaders foregoing further
operations against Baghdad).
O'Halloran, supra note 49, at 12.
260.
261.
See Ratner, supra note 103, at 891 (discussing the possibility of U.S.
officials being barred from traveling to Belgium); see also supra note 167 (discussing
limited travel by other world leaders including Israel's Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon).
Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 417.
262.
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founded: the Rome Statute expressly subjects military commanders
and other "superiors" to criminal responsibility for crimes "committed
by forces under his or her effective command and control. '263 It also
holds soldiers criminally responsible for following "manifestly
unlawful" orders, which include "orders to commit genocide or crimes
against humanity"264-charges recently raised against the United
26 5
States.
Human nature indicates that exposing military and political
leaders to criminal liability will modify how they make decisions.
While those who oppose war for any reason may applaud such a
change, those who prey on the weak and divided would also rejoice,
for they would have attained through legal processes that which they
could not achieve on the battlefield.
2. Diverting Resources from the War on Terror
Even where U.S. policymakers and commanders do not become
risk-averse, asymmetric exploitation of the ICC could betray
secrets, 266 waste resources, and distract leadership. Osama bin
Laden himself has advocated these methods to bankrupt the United
States in its war on terror. 267 Diverting resources could have a
significant impact on military operations:

263.
Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 28 (further requiring that commander
and superior "knew or . . .should have known" about crimes and "failed to take all
necessary and reasonable measures" to prevent them).
264.
Id. art. 33. By the Statute's own terms, a U.S. soldier may be criminally
responsible for following an order that involves "[t]orture," "[i]mprisonment ...in
violation of fundamental rules of international law," or "[o]ther inhumane
acts .. .causing great suffering ....
" Id. art. 7(1)(e), (f), (k).
265.
See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (discussing recent
allegations).
266.
One concern of military commanders and policy makers must be to protect
capabilities and plans in the U.S. war on terror. The Chief Prosecutor may require
access to sensitive classified information to conduct some ICC investigations. See
Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 72(5) (giving nation-states control over information
they wish to keep secret, but requiring cooperation). If a state refuses disclosure, see
id. arts. 72(6), 93(4) (allowing nation-states to refuse disclosure), the only ICC remedy
is to find the state "not acting in accordance with its obligations under the Statute," id.
art. 72(7)(a)(ii), and refer the case to the Assembly of States Parties or the U.N.
Security Council, see id. arts. 72(7)(a)(ii), 87(7). Although the treaty indicates classified
information will be handled in a secure ICC environment, the reality is that U.S.
national interests could be compromised when sensitive information comes into the
hands of the Chief Prosecutor, judges, and their staffs. See Steele, supra note 65, at
143. This concerns policy makers because "intelligence is indeed a virtual substitute
for violence, for capital, for labor, for time, and for space." Id.
267.
In a speech given on November 1, 2004, Mr. bin Laden stated:
[It is] easy for us to provoke and bait this [Bush] administration. All that we
have to do is to send two mujahidin to the furthest point east to raise a piece of
cloth on which is written al-Quaida, in order to make the generals race there to
cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses .... This is in
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It is foreseeable that groups opposed to all use of military force could tie
up military resources and man hours by making allegations of war
crimes, no matter how frivolous. United States policy makers may find
themselves before the court having to defend United States actions in
268
the use of force against blatantly aggressive nations.

A major concern from an asymmetric warfare standpoint is that
commanders in the field would be forced to thoroughly investigate
to avoid potential ICC
every civilian death or wayward bomb
jurisdiction. Though such investigations are unlikely to comfort the
victims of collateral damage, they will disrupt the mission and raise
costs.
269
The very structure of the ICC inexorably leads to this result.
In an effort to limit the Court's jurisdiction and placate objections by
the United States, 2 70 diplomats incorporated the principle of
complementarity into the treaty. Complementarity would prevent
the ICC from taking jurisdiction over a case that has been, or is
being, investigated by a State Party, leaving national jurisdictions
with primacy in prosecutions. 27 1 While promising in theory, this
principle leads to undesired results when combined with the Chief
Prosecutor's proprio motu power.272
Under the Rome Statute, the Chief Prosecutor is obliged to
inform any State when a formal investigation into an alleged

addition to our having experience in using guerilla warfare and the war of
attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers, as we, alongside the mujahidin, bled
Russia for 10 years, until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in
defeat .... So we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of
bankruptcy ....
[E]very
dollar
of
al-Quaida
defeated
a
million
dollars ....
[T]he mujahidin recently forced Bush to resort to emergency funds
to continue the fight in Afghanistan and Iraq, which is evidence of the success
of the bleed-until-bankruptcy plan.
Full Transcript of bin Laden's Speech, supra note 3.
268.
Smidt, supranote 31, at 201 (citation omitted).
269.
Amnesty International, while arguing for changes to the 1994 draft of the
Rome Statute, pointed out that the ICC was meant to do this very mission. See HALL,
supra note 24 ("[The ICC] would serve as a spur to national courts to assume their
responsibility to bring to justice those responsible for such crimes .... "). Similarly, the
Chief Prosecutor himself has stated that one purpose for the ICC is to "encourage
national prosecutions, where possible, for the lower-ranking perpetrators, or work with
the international community to ensure that the offenders are brought to justice by
some other means." Policy Paper,supra note 213, at 3.
270.
Despite these attempts at compromise, the United States remains
unsatisfied with the level of protection afforded to national sovereignty. See Seguin,
supra note 20, at 94.
271.
See Rome Statute, supra note 23, pmbl. ("Emphasizing that the
International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to
national jurisdictions .... ).
272.
See supra notes 127-50 and accompanying text (discussing proprio motu
power).
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violation has been opened. 273 This "heads up" provides the State an
opportunity to start its own investigation, triggering the protection of
complementarity-the Chief Prosecutor must defer to the State
unless he is convinced the state is unwilling or unable to carry out an
investigation or prosecution. 274 But pronouncements from the Chief
Prosecutor have added to this obligation: the normal practice of his
office is to inform the state in the "pre-investigation" phase 275 when
he is "analyzing" information to determine whether to initiate an
2 76
investigation:
[T]he Prosecutor will generally seek to alert the relevant State of the
possibility of taking action itself very early in the process. For this
reason, when the Office receives sufficiently detailed and credible
information about alleged crimes, the Office will in general consult with
and seek additional information from the States that would normally
exercise jurisdiction, unless there is reason to believe that such
consultations may prejudice the future conduct of an analysis or
27 7
investigation or jeopardize the safety of persons.

273.

See Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 18(1) ("When a situation has been

referred to the Court ... or the Prosecutor initiates an investigation ...."). In reality,

the Office of the Prosecutor intends to inform States of "future investigations" in order
to "alert" them to the "possibility of taking action." Policy Paper,supra note 213, at 5.
274.
Article 17 of the Rome Statute requires the Court to find a case
"inadmissible" where a state is conducting a "genuine" investigation or prosecution.
But if a state is "unwilling" to investigate or prosecute the alleged crime, the Court
may take jurisdiction. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 17(1)(a)-(b). A state will have
up to a month after being informed of an open investigation to tell the Court "that it is
investigating or has investigated" the crime. Id. art. 18(1)-(2). If the state contests
jurisdiction, "the Prosecutor shall suspend the investigation" until the Court makes a
determination. Id. art. 19(7). Non-state parties may also submit their "observations to
the Court" on whether the Court should have jurisdiction. Id. art. 19(3). Ultimately,
the ICC itself will decide whether it has jurisdiction over the case. Id. art. 19(1);
Seguin, supra note 20, at 92.
275.
According to provisional regulations, the Information and Evidence Unit
(IEU) of the Chief Prosecutor's office will prepare reports "on a weekly basis, or more
frequently as required by the number of communications received," analyzing the
communications received. See ANNEX, supra note 125, reg. 4.1. This regulation
anticipates large numbers of complaints and continual reports, which inevitably will be
reported to the States that are targeted by allegations. See id.
276.
The Office of the Prosecutor has stated, "In deciding whether to investigate
or prosecute, the Prosecutor must first assess whether there is or could be an exercise
of jurisdiction by national systems with respect to particular crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court. The Prosecutor can proceed only where States fail to
act .. " Policy Paper, supra note 213, at 4. To "first assess" this issue, the Chief
Prosecutor must ask the targeted State whether it has investigated or intends to
investigate. Id. The Chief Prosecutor's investigation of over 240 communications
regarding the 2003 Iraq War demonstrates that his office will indeed carry out this
policy of asking "relevant States" for information during the preliminary phase. See
IRAQ RESPONSE, supra note 135 and accompanying text.
277.
ANNEX, supra note 125, § I(C). In its provisional regulations, the Office of
the Prosecutor also indicates that it will "contact the State or States that would
normally exercise jurisdiction and seek additional information about inter alia the
existence and progress of national proceedings." Id. reg. 5.3(b).
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This notice will, in practice, force the state to conduct an
investigation to avoid jurisdiction, even where it believes it has acted
properly. 278 In the end, the Chief Prosecutor will exercise substantial
political influence over States Parties simply by raising the specter of
an investigation. Any state that fails to conduct an "independent" or
"impartial" investigation of the allegations would foolishly risk the
Court's meddling, even where the case is still in its pre-investigation
phase.
The very conduct of these state-led investigations could create
risk-averse behavior and divert the attention of both leaders and
subordinates from accomplishing the anti-terror mission.
For
instance, to conduct a thorough and timely inquiry, an investigation
should begin close in time to the incident.
Subordinates and
commanders alike will need to be questioned. Classified intelligence
will need to be examined. Command and control issues will need to
be explored.
Each day, this will consume time from the busy
schedules of personnel up and down the chain of command. Because
the ICC is most interested in complaints against high-level officials,
the President, Secretary of Defense, and other public figures may
need to be interviewed about their thoughts, actions, and motivations
for command decisions and policies.
Furthermore, even if the state undertakes an investigation and
determines no wrongdoing occurred, it runs the risk the Chief
Prosecutor may determine the state was unwilling or unable to
genuinely carry out the investigation. 2 79 No standards are set forth
in the Statute to define what "unwilling" means, 28 0 although it is
likely that over time the Court will develop its own standards and
precedents for making this evaluation. 28 1 Faced with the uncertainty

278.
Van de Kieft, supra note 252, at 2336 (arguing that if a state believes its
action is legitimate, it would have no will to investigate when faced with a complaint).
279.
Even when investigations are undertaken, critics of U.S. policy are rarely
satisfied. For example, in light of the scandal at Abu Ghraib and the subsequent
investigations, Amnesty International called for an "independent and public inquiry
into all allegations of the torture of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. and coalition troops."
Amnesty VOA News, InternationalCalls for Inquiry into Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners, THE
EPOCH TIMES, May 4, 2004, http://english.epochtimes.com/news/4-5-4/21248.html.

Amnesty International claims to have received scores of complaints of ill treatment.

Id.
280.
Presumably, only circumstantial evidence of unwillingness needs to be
shown as the statute is silent on the need for any direct evidence of unwillingness.
Also, the Office of the Prosecutor has suggested that a State is "unwilling" if it
specifically decides to "shield[ I" the suspect, if it has an "unjustified delay" in the
process, or if the proceedings are not "conducted independently or impartially." Policy
Paper, supra note 213, at 4. This definition, however, is ultimately standardless and
thoroughly within the Prosecutor and Pre-Trial Chamber's subjective assessments.
Defining this standard was raised as a recommendation at the first Public Hearing of
the Chief Prosecutor in 2003. See Prosecutor Comments, supra note 144, at 4.
281.
In a critique of the ICC, the Cato Institute has argued:
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of how a Chief Prosecutor will view a case, 282 then, it is easy to
foresee the United States investigating far more issues than it would
normally deem necessary. In short, there is potential for inefficiency
and distraction, which would play well into the overall strategies of
asymmetric warriors.
3. Splitting International Coalitions
To truly weaken efforts to win the war on terror, it is not enough
for adversaries of the United States to frighten policymakers and
distract commanders in the field. A major prong of an effective
asymmetric strategy must be to isolate the United States from the
rest of the international community and to split international
coalitions. The United States relies on coalitions to carry out its war
on terror; 28 3 yet, coalitions can be fragile. Some weaknesses of
coalitions include "the political process by which the decision in
Washington to use force is made after a period of intense and open
debate," "the casualty aversion of coalition publics," and "the powerful
role of the news media in magnifying fears and anxieties and in
28 4
motivating U.S. actions."
Saddam Hussein demonstrated a classic method of asymmetric
coalition-splitting when he masterfully divided the former Gulf-War

The ICC will also become an unavoidable participant in the national legal
process. Indeed, because it will set precedents regarding what it considers
"effective" and "ineffective" domestic criminal trials, the ICC will indirectly
force states to adopt those precedents or risk having cases called up before the
international court. That constitutes an unprecedented change in the sources
of national lawmaking, one that diminishes the traditional notion of state
sovereignty.
Dempsey, supra note 119, at 6. The Office of the Prosecutor itself has acknowledged
that "detailed, exhaustive guidelines for [the Office of the Prosecutor's] operation will
probably be developed over the years." Policy Paper,supra note 213, at 5.
For instance, what would happen if a state does not have a criminal code
282.
that exactly replicates the range of offenses under the Rome Statute? Conceivably, the
Chief Prosecutor might consider such a state "unable" to prosecute the crimes.
Further, the state may have a different interpretation of what constitutes one of the
crimes defined by the Rome Statute. For example, the Rome Statute prohibits torture
as a crime against humanity. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 7(1)(f). While U.S.
military leaders have deemed torture forbidden at Guantanamo Bay, organizations
such as Amnesty International and the International Red Cross have expressed
concerns that torture is occurring. If the issue were considered by the Court, whose
argument would the Court find more convincing? Similarly, the Statute forbids
"[e]xtensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly." Rome Statute, supra note 23, art.
8(2)(a)iv). Is the leadership of the U.S. military prepared to allow a civilian court to
evaluate the concept of military necessity in relation to U.S. activities?
283. ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 4.
284. Id.
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coalition that had kept Iraq in check after it invaded Kuwait. 28 5 In
the mid-1990s, Iraq began entering into lucrative international
contracts with coalition partners such as France, Russia, and
China. 28 6 The contracts would only take effect when international
economic sanctions were lifted, giving these allies an incentive to
disagree with the United States on the sanctions issue. 287 Iraq also
alienated Arab nations from the coalition by pitting them against
Israel; Iraq argued that there was a "double standard" that allowed
Israel the possession of many nuclear weapons while denying an Arab
nation such as Iraq even a single one. 28 8 When Iraq banned U.N.
weapons inspections for a period of three months in 1997-almost
provoking "coalition" military intervention-France, Russia, and
China distanced themselves from the coalition and no Arab nation
but Kuwait stood with the United States. 28 9 The United States was
denied over-flight rights by some Arab nations, while others refused
29 0
to allow the United States to use their bases as an origin of attack.
The danger never materialized, however, when Iraq backed away
from the brink of war and allowed U.N. weapons inspections again in
December 1997.291
Modern asymmetrical warriors may attempt to use the ICC to
drive a wedge between the United States and the international
community. There is no doubt that terrorist groups seek to split the
international coalition fighting the war on terror. Taking a page from
Saddam Hussein's playbook, Osama bin Laden has been using this
same tactic in an attempt to alienate Muslim nations from the United
States. 2 92 Many U.S. allies have already joined the ICC and now
have a vested interest in the Court's success. If the United States

285.
This paragraph's discussion of Saddam Hussein's coalition-splitting activity
is drawn from O'Halloran, supra note 49, at 17-18.
286.
Id. at 18.
287.
Id.
288.
Id.
289.
Id. at 17.
290.
Id. at 18.
291.
Id. at 17.
292.
In a speech released November 1, 2004, Mr. bin Laden stated:
[Ilt had never occurred to us to strike the [Twin] towers. But after it became
unbearable and we witnessed the oppression and tyranny of the
American/Israeli coalition against our people in Palestine and Lebanon, it came
to my mind ....

[It] started in 1982 when America permitted the Israelis to

invade Lebanon and the American Sixth Fleet helped them in that. This
bombardment began and many were killed and injured and others were
terrorized and displaced . . . .

And that day, it was confirmed to me that

oppression and the intentional killing of innocent women and children is a
deliberate American policy ....
[E]very [U.S.] state that doesn't play with our
security [by voting for President Bush] has automatically guaranteed its own
security.
Full Transcriptof bin Laden's Speech, supra note 3.

344

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL, 39..291

were to join the Court and then, for example, fail to comply with a
request from the Chief Prosecutor, 293 intense international pressure
Moreover, even
may be levied attempt to force compliance.
unsubstantiated ICC cases against U.S. officials may cause other
nations to politically back away from coalitions, handing terrorists a
major victory. For instance, if a coalition partner were to deny the
United States access to its bases for specific operations in the war on
terror, the mission could be seriously hampered.
If asymmetric warriors can exploit the ICC to garner
international opinion against the United States, they will have gone
far in nullifying offensive operations in the war on terror.
Sidetracked by coalition-preserving, the United States might take a
more defensive posture and minimize potentially offending
operations. More important, if nations deny the United States access
to foreign bases, overfly rights, or use of their facilities to launch
operations, the capability of the United States to conduct an effective
war on terror will be impaired.

V. CONCLUSION

The ICC is currently a fledgling institution struggling for its own
identity, legitimacy, and survival. If it endures, it will emerge from
this time of trial as an emboldened institution, fully empowered by
the consent of nation-states who have given up a portion of their
national sovereignty to the Court-a potential "Big Bad Wolf."
The Court's developing processes and policies have created a
structure that can be asymmetrically exploited in the future,
especially if the United States ratifies the Rome Treaty. NGOs are
innumerable and each has its own political agenda; they will have
formalized avenues of access to the Office of the Prosecutor, where
they may present allegations against the United States with little
restraint. The Chief Prosecutor's proprio motu power will require
him to seriously analyze all allegations of U.S. war crimes-some
potentially exaggerated or fraudulent. During a pre-investigation
phase, the Chief Prosecutor will inform the United States of the
claim, which will prompt a U.S. investigation to gain the protection of
complementarity. Mass media will play havoc with such a scenario,
broadcasting the complaints that expose high-level U.S. politicians
and military leaders to jeopardy.
For the United States-a nation at war against terrorism and
the world's only superpower-misuse of the ICC could provide
asymmetric warriors the sling with which David can slay Goliath. A

293.
See Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 15(2) ("The Prosecutor ... may seek
additional information from States ...").
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nation built on law can be undone by law. Given these allegations,
U.S. officials may cease to press the offensive and take a risk-averse
posture that could ultimately jeopardize the national security of the
United States. Even principled acts of war could be exploited through
the processes of the ICC to force the diversion of precious resources in
the battle against terror, split up international coalitions, and reduce
the dominance of U.S. hegemony throughout the world.
When deciding in the future whether to join the ICC, the United
States must consider the potential for asymmetric warfare built into
the Court's processes. Only then will it be able to plan to avoid this
landmine. If the nation chooses to accept these risks for the cause of
international justice, at least it will have done so with both eyes wide
open.

